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Abstract
We propose a purely extensional semantics for higher-order logic programming. In this
semantics program predicates denote sets of ordered tuples, and two predicates are equal
iff they are equal as sets. Moreover, every program has a unique minimum Herbrand model
which is the greatest lower bound of all Herbrand models of the program and the least
fixed-point of an immediate consequence operator. We also propose an SLD-resolution
proof procedure which is proven sound and complete with respect to the minimum model
semantics. In other words, we provide a purely extensional theoretical framework for
higher-order logic programming which generalizes the familiar theory of classical (first-
order) logic programming.
1 Introduction
The two most prominent declarative paradigms, namely logic and functional programming,
differ radically in an important aspect: logic programming is traditionally first-order while
functional programming encourages and promotes the use of higher-order functions and con-
structs. One problem is that even second-order logic fails in terms of vital properties such as
completeness and compactness. It would seem, on the face of it, that there would be no hope
of finding a complete resolution proof procedure for higher-order logic programming.
The initial attitude of logic programmers towards higher-order logic programming was
somewhat skeptical: it was often argued (see for example [War82]) that there exist ways of
encoding or simulating higher-order programming inside Prolog itself. However ease of use is
a primary criterion for a programming language, and the fact that higher-order features can
be simulated or encoded does not mean that it is practical to do so.
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Eventually extensions with genuine higher-order capabilities were introduced - roughly
speaking, extensions which allow predicates to be applied but also passed as parameters. The
two most prominent such languages are λProlog [MN86, Nad87] and HiLog [CKW89, CKW93].
These two systems share a common idea, namely they are both intensional. Intuitively speak-
ing, an intensional language places almost no restraints on the way in which a predicate can be
passed and used. In an intensional language it is possible that two co-extensional predicates
are not considered equal. In other words, a predicate in such a language is more than just the
set of arguments for which it is true.
However, for many applications intensionality appears to be appropriate. Suppose, for
example, we have a database of professions, both of their membership and their status. We
might have rules such as:
engineer(tom).
engineer(sally).
programmer(harry).
with engineer and programmer used as predicates. But in intensional higher-order logic
programming we could also have rules in which these are arguments, eg:
profession(engineer).
profession(programmer).
Now suppose tom and sally are also avid users of Twitter. We could have rules:
tweeter(tom).
tweeter(sally).
In the absence of other rules, it is clear that the tweeters are exactly the engineers; but the
query:
?-profession(tweeter).
fails. This failure contradicts the extensionality principle, which holds that predicates that
succeed for exactly the same instances are equal. However, in this context the failure of
extensionality does not seem unnatural.
Nevertheless, the failure of extensionality cannot in general be taken lightly. It means
that we cannot use our mathematicians’ intuitions of relations, intuitions based on hundreds
of years of mathematical development. It raises doubts that rules like those just given can
have a simple declarative meaning. Moreover, there are many applications that call for higher-
order logic (predicates used as arguments) but do not involve intensional notions. As a simple
example, consider the predicate allmembers(L,P) which asserts that all elements of the list
L have property P. Predicate allmembers raises no foundational issues and the corresponding
rules seem obvious:
allmembers([],P).
allmembers([H|T],P):-P(H),allmembers(T,P).
However this is not legitimate Prolog, and to write these rules we currently have no choice
but to use an intensional higher-order language, even though the logic behind allmembers is
entirely extensional. For example, if the query:
?-allmembers([a,b,c],p).
succeeds and q is co-extensional with p, we can be sure that the query
?-allmembers([a,b,c],q).
will also succeed.
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Are there more modest higher-order extensions of logic programming that do not entail
intensionality? After all, higher-order extensions of functional programming are almost all
extensional. This question was first raised by W. W. Wadge in [Wad91] and answered in
the affirmative. Wadge discovered a simple syntactic restriction which, though it limited the
applicability of the language, ensured that compliant programs have an extensional declarative
reading. The restriction forbids a user-defined predicate to appear as an argument in the head
of a clause. For example, of the rules cited already,
profession(engineer).
violates the restriction, but
allmembers([],P).
complies with it. Roughly speaking, the restriction says that rules about predicates can state
general principles but cannot pick out a particular predicate for special treatment. Wadge
gave several examples of useful extensional higher-order programs and outlined the proof of a
minimum-model result. He also showed that in this model the denotations of program predi-
cates are monotonic and continuous. Continuity, in this context, is a kind of finitaryness. For
example, if foo(p) succeeds and foo is continuous, it means there is a finite set of arguments
{a1, . . . , ak} for which p(a1), . . . , p(ak) all succeed; moreover, if q(a1), . . . , q(ak) also succeed,
then foo(q) succeeds.
Contributions: In this paper we extend the study initiated in [Wad91] and derive the first,
to our knowledge, complete theoretical framework for extensional higher-order logic program-
ming, both from a semantic as-well-as from a proof theoretic point of view.
Our first contribution is the development of a novel extensional semantics for higher-order
logic programming that is based on algebraic lattices (see for example [Gra78]), a subclass of
the familiar complete lattices that have traditionally been used in the theory of first-order
logic programming. For every predicate type of our language, algebraic lattices single out a
subset of “finite” objects of that type. In other words, the proposed semantics reflects in a
direct way the finitary nature of continuity that is implicit in [Wad91]. The benefit of the new
approach compared to that of [Wad91] is that all basic properties and results of classical logic
programming are now transferred in the higher-order setting in a natural way. Moreover, the
new semantics leads to a relatively simple sound and complete proof procedure (see below)
even for a language that is genuinely more powerful than the one considered in [Wad91]. More
details on the connections between the two approaches will be given in 5.3.
Our second contribution fixes a major shortcoming of Wadge’s language by allowing clause
bodies and program goals to have uninstantiated higher-order variables. To understand the
importance of this extension, consider the following axiom for bands (musical ensembles):
band(B):-singer(S),B(S),drummer(D),B(D),guitarist(G),B(G).
This says that a band is a group that has at least a singer, a drummer, and a guitarist. Suppose
that we also have a database of musicians:
singer(sally).
singer(steve).
drummer(dave).
guitarist(george).
guitarist(grace).
Our extensional higher-order language allows the query ?-band(B). At first sight a query
like this is impractical if not impossible to implement. Since a band is a set, bands can be
very large and there can be many, possibly uncountably infinitely many of them. In existing
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intensional systems such queries fail since the program does not provide any information about
any particular band.
However, in an extensional context the finitary behavior of the predicates of our language,
saves us. If the predicate band declares a relation to be a band, then (due to the finitaryness
described above) it must have examined only finitely many members of the relation. Therefore
we can enumerate the bands by enumerating finite bands, and this collection is countable (in
this particular example it is actually finite). Actually, as we are going to see, this enumeration
can be performed in a careful way so as that it avoids producing all finite relations one by one
(see the discussion in Section 2 that follows).
Our final contribution, and not the least, is a relatively simple proof procedure for exten-
sional higher-order logic programming, which extends classical SLD-resolution. We demon-
strate that the new proof procedure is sound and complete with respect to the proposed
semantics. In particular, the derived completeness theorems generalize the well-known such
theorems for first-order logic programming. This result may, at first sight, also seem paradoxi-
cal, given the well-known failure of completeness for even second-order logic. But the paradox
is resolved by recalling that we are dealing with a restricted subset of higher-order logic and
that the denotations of the types of our language are not arbitrary sets but instead algebraic
lattices (which have a much more refined structure).
One very important benefit of the proof procedure is that it gives us an operational seman-
tics for our language. This means in turn that we could probably extend it with cut, negation
and other operational features not easily specified in terms of model theory alone.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents in a more detailed manner
the basic ideas developed in this paper. Section 3 introduces the syntax of the higher-order
logic programming language H. Section 4 introduces the key lattice-theoretic notions that will
be needed in the development of the semantics. Sections 5 and 6 develop the semantics and
the minimum Herbrand model semantics of H; the main properties of the semantics are also
established. Section 7 introduces an SLD-resolution proof procedure for H and establishes its
soundness and completeness. Section 8 presents a brief description of related approaches to
higher-order logic programming. Section 9 briefly discusses implementation issues and presents
certain interesting topics for future work. The lengthiest among the proofs have been moved
to corresponding appendices in order to enhance the readability of the paper.
2 The Proposed Approach: an Intuitive Overview
As discussed in the previous section, the purpose of this paper is to develop a purely ex-
tensional theoretical framework for higher-order logic programming which will generalize the
familiar theory of first-order logic programming. The first problem we consider is to bypass
one important restriction of [Wad91], namely the inability to handle programs in which clauses
contain uninstantiated predicate variables. The following example illustrates these ideas:
Example 2.1 Consider the following higher-order program written in an extended Prolog-like
syntax:
p(Q):-Q(0),Q(s(0)).
nat(0).
nat(s(X)):-nat(X).
The Herbrand universe of the program is the set of natural numbers in successor notation.
According to the semantics of [Wad91], the least Herbrand model of the program assigns to
predicate p a continuous relation which is true of all unary relations that contain at least 0
and s(0). Consider now the query:
?-p(R).
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which asks for all relations that satisfy p. Such a query seems completely unreasonable, since
there exist uncountably many relations that must be substituted and tested in the place of R.
The above example illustrates why uninstantiated predicate variables in clauses were dis-
allowed in [Wad91]. From a theoretical point of view, one could extend the semantics to cover
such cases, but the problem is mainly a practical one: “how can one implement such programs
and queries?”.
In more formal terms, the least Herbrand model of a higher-order program under the
semantics of [Wad91] is in general an uncountable set; in our example, this is evidenced by the
fact that there exists an uncountable number of unary relations over the natural numbers that
contain both 0 and s(0). This observation comes in contrast with the semantics of first-order
logic programming in which the least Herbrand model of a program is a countable set. How
can one define a proof procedure that is sound and complete with respect to this semantics?
The key idea for bypassing these problems was actually anticipated in the concluding section
of [Wad91]:
Our higher order predicates, however, are continuous: if a relation satisfies a pred-
icate, then some finite subset satisfies it. This means that we have to examine only
finite relations.
In the above example, despite the fact that there exists an infinite number of relations that
satisfy p, all these relations are supersets of the finite relation {0, s(0)}. In some sense, this
finite relation represents all the relations that satisfy p. But how can we make the notion of
“finiteness” more explicit? In order to define a sound and complete proof procedure for an
interesting extensional higher-order logic programming language, our semantics must in some
sense reflect the above “finitary” concepts more explicitly.
An idea that springs to mind is to define an alternative semantics in which variables (like
Q in Example 2.1) range over finite relations (and not over arbitrary relations as in [Wad91]).
Of course, the notion of “finite” should be appropriately defined for every predicate type. But
then an immediate difficulty appears to arise. Given again the program in Example 2.1, and
the query
?-p(nat).
it is not immediately obvious what the meaning of the above is. Since we have assumed that Q
ranges over finite relations, how can p be applied to an infinite one? To overcome this problem,
observe that in order for the predicate p to succeed for its argument Q, it only has to examine
a “finite number of facts” about Q (namely whether Q is true of 0 and s(0)). This remark
suggests that the meaning of p(nat) can be established following a non-standard interpretation
of application: we apply the meaning of p to all the “finite approximations” of the meaning
of nat, ie., to all finite subsets of the set {0, s(0), s(s(0)), . . .}. In our case p(nat) will be
true since there exists a finite subset of the meaning of nat for which the meaning of p is true
(namely the set {0, s(0)}).
Notice that the new semantical approach outlined above, heavily relies on the idea that the
meaning of predicates (like nat) can be expressed as the least upper bound of a set of simpler
(in this case, finite) relations. Actually, this is an old and well-known assumption in the area
of denotational semantics, as the following excerpt from [Sto77][page 98] indicates:
So we may reasonably demand of all the value spaces in which we hope to compute
that they come equipped with a particular countable subset of elements from which
all the other elements may be built up.
As we are going to demonstrate, the meaning of every predicate defined in our language pos-
sesses the property just mentioned, and this allows us to use the new non-standard semantics
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of application. In fact, as we are going to see, for every predicate type of our language, the set
of possible meanings of this type forms an algebraic lattice [Gra78]; then, the above property
is nothing more than the key property which characterizes algebraic lattices (see Proposi-
tion 4.14), namely that “every element of an algebraic lattice is the least upper bound of the
compact elements of the lattice that are below it”. More importantly, for the algebraic lattices
we consider, it is relatively easy to identify these compact elements and to enumerate them one
by one. Based on the above semantics, we are able to derive for higher-order logic programs
many properties that are either identical or generalize the familiar ones from first-order logic
programming (see Section 6).
The new semantics allows us to introduce a relatively simple, sound and complete proof
procedure which applies to programs and queries that may contain uninstantiated predicate
variables. This is due to the fact that the set of “finite” relations is now countable, and as we
are going to see, there exist interesting ways of producing and enumerating them. The key
idea can be demonstrated by continuing Example 2.1. Given the query:
?-p(R).
one (inefficient and tedious) approach would be to enumerate all possible finite relations of
the appropriate type over the Herbrand universe. Instead of this, we use an approach which
is based on what we call basic templates: a basic template for R is (intuitively) a finite set
whose elements are individual variables. This saves us from having to enumerate all finite
sets consisting of ground terms from the Herbrand universe. For example1, assume that we
instantiate R with the template {X, Y}. Then, the resolution proceeds as follows:
?-p(R)
?-p({X, Y})
?-{X, Y}(0), {X, Y}(s(0))
?-{0, Y}(s(0))
✷
and the proof procedure will return the answer R = {0, s(0)}. The proof procedure will
also return other finite solutions, such as R = {0, s(0), Z1}, R = {0, s(0), Z1, Z2}, and so on.
However, a slightly optimized implementation (see Section 9) can be created that returns
only the answer R = {0, s(0)}, which represents all the finite relations produced by the proof
procedure. The intuition behind the above answer is that the given query succeeds for all
unary relations that contain at least 0 and s(0). Similarly, for the band example of Section 1,
the implementation will systematically assemble all the minimal three-member bands from the
talents available.
3 The Higher-Order Language H: Syntax
In this section we introduce the higher-order logic programming language H, which extends
classical first-order logic programming to a higher-order setting. The language H is based on
a simple type system that supports two base types: o, the boolean domain, and ι, the domain
of individuals (data objects). The composite types are partitioned into three classes: func-
tional (assigned to function symbols), predicate (assigned to predicate symbols) and argument
(assigned to parameters of predicates).
Definition 3.1 A type can either be functional, argument, or predicate:
σ := ι | (ι→ σ)
ρ := ι | π
π := o | (ρ→ π)
1The notation we use for representing basic templates will slightly change in Section 7.
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We will use τ to denote an arbitrary type (either functional, argument or predicate one).
As usual, the binary operator → is right-associative. A functional type that is different
than ι will often be written in the form ιn → ι, n ≥ 1. Moreover, it can be easily seen that
every predicate type π can be written in the form ρ1 → · · · → ρn → o, n ≥ 0 (for n = 0 we
assume that π = o).
We can now proceed to the definition of H, starting from its alphabet:
Definition 3.2 The alphabet of the higher-order language H consists of the following:
1. Predicate variables of every predicate type π (denoted by capital letters such as P,Q,R, . . .).
2. Predicate constants of every predicate type π (denoted by lowercase letters such as
p, q, r, . . .).
3. Individual variables of type ι (denoted by capital letters such as X,Y,Z, . . .).
4. Individual constants of type ι (denoted by lowercase letters such as a, b, c, . . .).
5. Function symbols of every functional type σ 6= ι (denoted by lowercase letters such as
f, g, h, . . .).
6. The following logical constant symbols: the propositional constants 0 and 1 of type o;
the equality constant ≈ of type ι → ι → o; the generalized disjunction and conjunction
constants
∨
π and
∧
π of type π → π → o, for every predicate type π; the generalized
inverse implication constants ←π, of type π → π → o, for every predicate type π; the
existential quantifier ∃ρ, of type (ρ→ o)→ o, for every argument type ρ.
7. The abstractor λ and the parentheses “(” and “)”.
The set consisting of the predicate variables and the individual variables of H, will be called
the set of argument variables of H. Argument variables will be usually denoted by V and its
subscripted versions.
The existential quantifier in higher-order logic is usually introduced in a different way than
in first-order logic. So, for example, in order to express the quantification of the argument
variable V of type ρ over the expression E one writes (∃ρ (λV.E)). For simplicity, we will use
in this paper the more familiar notation (∃ρVE).
We proceed by defining the set of positive expressions of H:
Definition 3.3 The set of positive expressions of the higher-order language H is recursively
defined as follows:
1. Every predicate variable (respectively, predicate constant) of type π is a positive expres-
sion of type π; every individual variable (respectively, individual constant) of type ι is a
positive expression of type ι; the propositional constants 0 and 1 are positive expressions
of type o.
2. If f is an n-ary function symbol and E1, . . . ,En are positive expressions of type ι, then
(f E1 · · ·En) is a positive expression of type ι.
3. If E1 is a positive expression of type ρ → π and E2 is a positive expression of type ρ,
then (E1E2) is a positive expression of type π.
4. If V is an argument variable of type ρ and E is a positive expression of type π, then
(λV.E) is a positive expression of type ρ→ π.
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5. If E1,E2 are positive expressions of type π, then (E1
∧
π E2) and (E1
∨
π E2) are positive
expressions of type π.
6. If E1,E2 are positive expressions of type ι, then (E1 ≈ E2) is a positive expression of type
o.
7. If E is an expression of type o and V is an argument variable of any type ρ, then (∃ρVE)
is a positive expression of type o.
The notions of free and bound variables of an expression are defined as usual. An expression
is called closed if it does not contain any free variables.
The set of clausal expressions of H can now be specified:
Definition 3.4 The set of clausal expressions of the higher-order language H is defined as
follows:
1. If p is a predicate constant of type π and E is a closed positive expression of type π then
p←π E is a clausal expression of type o of H, also called a program clause.
2. If E is a positive expression of type o, then 0 ←o E (usually denoted by ←o E or just
← E) is a clausal expression of type o of H, also called a goal clause.
Notice that (following the tradition of first-order logic programming) we will often talk about
the “empty clause” which is denoted by ✷ and is equivalent to the propositional constant 1.
The union of the sets of positive and clausal expressions of H will be called the set of
expressions of H. To denote that an expression E has type τ , we will often write E : τ ;
additionally, we write type(E) to denote the type of expression E. Expressions of type ι will be
called terms and of type o will be called formulas. We will write←, ∧ and ∨ instead of←o,
∧
o
and
∨
o. Moreover, instead of ∃ρ we will often write ∃. When writing an expression, in order
to avoid the excessive use of parentheses, certain usual conventions will be adopted (such as
for example the usual priorities between logical constants, the convention that application is
left-associative and that lambda abstraction extends as far to the right as possible, and so on).
Given an expression E, we denote by FV (E) the set of all free variables of E. By overloading
notation, we will also write FV (S), where S is a set of expressions.
Notice that in Definition 3.4 above, a goal clause may contain two types of occurrences of
variables that serve a similar purpose, namely free argument variables and argument variables
that are existentially quantified. From a semantic point of view, these two types of variables are
essentially the same. However, in a later section we will distinguish them from an operational
point of view: the free argument variables that appear in a goal are the ones for which an
answer is sought for by the proof procedure; the argument variables that are existentially
quantified are essentially free variables for which an answer is not sought for (something like
the underscored variables in Prolog systems). This distinction is not an important one, and we
could have proceeded in a different way (eg. by disallowing existentially quantified variables
from goals).
Definition 3.5 A program of H is a set of program clauses of H.
Example 3.6 The following is a higher-order program that computes the closure of its input
binary relation R. The type of closure is π = (ι→ ι→ o)→ ι→ ι→ o.
closure←π λR.λX.λY.(R X Y)
closure←π λR.λX.λY.∃Z((R X Z)∧(closure R Z Y))
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or even more compactly:
closure←π (λR.λX.λY.(R X Y))
∨
π (λR.λX.λY.∃Z((R X Z)∧(closure R Z Y)))
A possible query could be: ← (closure R a b) (which intuitively requests for those binary
relations such that the pair (a, b) belongs to their transitive closure). In a Prolog-like extended
syntax, the above program would have been written as:
closure(R,X, Y) :- R(X, Y).
closure(R,X, Y) :- R(X, Z), closure(R,Z, Y).
and the corresponding query as ← closure(R,a, b).
Example 3.7 We define a predicate ordered which checks whether its second argument (a
list) is ordered according to its first argument (a binary relation). The type of ordered is
π = (ι → ι → o) → ι → o (notice that the type of a list is also ι since a list is nothing more
than a term). In Prolog-like syntax, the program is the following:
ordered(R,[ ]).
ordered(R,[X]).
ordered(R,[X,Y|T]):- R(X,Y), ordered(R,[Y|T]).
In the syntax of H (slightly extended with the standard notation for lists), the above program
can be written as follows:
ordered←π λR.λL.(L≈[])
ordered←π λR.λL.(∃X(L≈[X]))
ordered←π λR.λL.(∃X∃Y∃T((L≈[X,Y|T])∧(R X Y)∧(ordered R [Y|T])))
Assume that we have also defined a binary relation less which succeeds if its first argument (eg.
a natural number) is less than the second one. Then, the query ← ordered less [1,4,7,10]
is expected to succeed. On the other hand, the query ← ordered R [a,b,c,d] requests for
all binary relations under which the list [a,b,c,d] is ordered. As it will become clear in the
subsequent sections of the paper, this is a meaningful question which can obtain a reasonable
answer.
4 Algebraic Lattices
In order to develop the semantics of H, we first need to introduce certain lattice-theoretic con-
cepts. As it is well-known, the standard semantics of classical (first-order) logic programming,
is based on complete lattices (see for example [Llo87]). As we are going to see, the development
of the semantics of H is based on a special class of complete lattices, namely algebraic lattices
(see for example [Gra78]). An algebraic lattice is a complete lattice in which every element
can be created by using certain compact (intuitively, “simple”) elements of the lattice. In our
setting, these compact elements will be the ones that the proof procedure will generate in
order to answer queries that involve uninstantiated predicate variables. We should mention
at this point that algebraic partially ordered sets are widely used in domain theory (see for
example [AJ94]).
We start by introducing some mathematical preliminaries concerning lattice theory. Since
the bibliography on partially ordered sets is huge, certain results appear in one form or another
in various contexts, and they are often hard to locate in the exact form needed. Proposi-
tions 4.7, 4.10 and 4.14 fall into this category; for reasons of completeness, we have included
short proofs for them. On the other hand, Lemma 4.17 is, to our knowledge, new. We start
with some basic definitions:
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Definition 4.1 A set P with a binary relation ⊑P is called a partially ordered set or poset
if ⊑P is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
Usually, the subscript P in ⊑P will be omitted when it is obvious from context.
Definition 4.2 Let P be a poset. An element x ∈ P is called an upper bound for a subset
A ⊆ P , if for every y ∈ A, y ⊑ x. If the set of upper bounds of A has a least element, then this
element is called the least upper bound (or lub) of A and is denoted by
⊔
A. Symmetrically,
one can define the notions of lower bound and greatest lower bound (or glb) of A (this last
notion denoted by
d
A).
The following proposition (see for example [AJ94][Proposition 2.1.4]) will prove useful later in
the paper:
Proposition 4.3 Let P be a poset and let A,B, (Ai)i∈I be subsets of P . Then, the following
statements hold (provided the glbs and lubs occurring in the formulas exist):
1. A ⊆ B implies
⊔
A ⊑
⊔
B.
2. If A =
⋃
i∈I Ai, then
⊔
A =
⊔
i∈I(
⊔
Ai).
Definition 4.4 Let P be a poset. A subset A of P is directed, if it is nonempty and each
pair of elements of A has an upper bound in A.
Definition 4.5 Let P and Q be posets. A function f : P → Q is called monotonic if for all
x, y ∈ P with x ⊑P y, we have f(x) ⊑Q f(y). The set of all monotonic functions from P to
Q is denoted by [P
m
→ Q].
Notice that monotonicity can be generalized in the obvious way for functions f : Pn → Q,
n > 0, since Pn is also a poset (where the partial order in this case is defined in a point-wise
way).
We are particularly interested in one type of posets, namely complete lattices:
Definition 4.6 A poset L in which every subset has a least upper bound and a greatest lower
bound, is called a complete lattice.
In fact, there is a symmetry here: the existence of all least upper bounds suffices to prove that
a poset is indeed a complete lattice, a fact that we will freely use throughout the paper.
Proposition 4.7 Let P be a poset, L a complete lattice and let f : P ×P → L be a monotonic
function. Then,
⊔
x∈P,y∈P f(x, y) =
⊔
x∈P f(x, x).
Proof. An easy proof using basic properties of posets (see for example the corresponding
proof for domains [Ten91][Lemma 5.3, page 92]).
Definition 4.8 Let L be a complete lattice. A function f : L→ L is called continuous if it is
monotonic and for every directed subset A of L, we have f(
⊔
A) =
⊔
f(A).
We will write ⊥L for the greatest lower bound of a complete lattice L (called the bottom
element of L). A very useful tool in lattice theory, is Kleene’s fixpoint theorem:
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Theorem 4.9 Let L be a complete lattice. Then, every continuous function f : L→ L has a
least fixpoint lfp(f) given by lfp(f) =
⊔
n<ω f
n(⊥L).
Let A be an arbitrary set and L be a complete lattice. Then, a partial order can be defined
on A → L: for all f, g ∈ A → L, we write f ⊑A→L g if for all a ∈ A, f(a) ⊑L g(a). We will
often use the following proposition:
Proposition 4.10 Let A be a poset, L a complete lattice and let F ⊆ [A
m
→ L]. Then, for all
a ∈ A, (
⊔
F )(a) =
⊔
f∈F f(a) and (
d
F )(a) =
d
f∈F f(a). Therefore, [A
m
→ L] is a complete
lattice.
Proof. We give the proof for
⊔
(the proof for
d
is symmetrical). Let h ∈ A→ L such that
h(a) =
⊔
f∈F f(a), where the least upper bound is well-defined because L is a complete lattice.
Notice that h is obviously an upper bound of F . Now let g be an arbitrary upper bound of F .
For each a ∈ A, it holds that g(a) is an upper bound of {f(a) | f ∈ F}, thus
⊔
f∈F f(a) ⊑ g(a)
which means that h ⊑ g. Therefore, h =
⊔
F .
It remains to show that h is monotonic. Consider x, y ∈ A such that x ⊑ y. For all f ∈ F
we have f(x) ⊑ f(y) due to the monotonicity of f . Since
⊔
f∈F f(y) is an upper bound of
{f(y) | f ∈ F}, it is also an upper bound of {f(x) | f ∈ F}. Therefore,
⊔
f∈F f(x) ⊑
⊔
f∈F f(y)
and consequently h is monotonic.
We will be interested in a certain type of complete lattices in which every element can be
“created” by using a set of compact (intuitively, “simple”) elements of the lattice:
Definition 4.11 Let L be a complete lattice and let c ∈ L. Then c is called compact if for
every A ⊆ L such that c ⊑
⊔
A, there exists finite A′ ⊆ A such that c ⊑
⊔
A′. The set of all
compact elements of L is denoted by K(L).
We can now define the notion of algebraic lattice (see for example [Gra78]), which will prove
to be the key lattice-theoretic concept applicable to our context.
Definition 4.12 A complete lattice L is called algebraic if every element of L is the least
upper bound of a set of compact elements of L.
The name “algebraic lattice” is due to G. Birkhoff [Bir67] (who did not assume completeness
at that time). In the literature, algebraic lattices are also called compactly generated lattices.
Example 4.13 The set L = {0, 1} under the usual numerical ordering is an algebraic lattice
with K(L) = {0, 1}.
Let S be a set. Then, 2S, the set of all subsets of S, forms a complete lattice under set
inclusion. It is easy to see that this is an algebraic lattice whose compact elements are the
finite subsets of S.
Let P be a poset. Given B ⊆ P and x ∈ P , we write B[x] = {b ∈ B | b ⊑P x}. We have the
following easy proposition:
Proposition 4.14 Let L be an algebraic lattice. Then, for every x ∈ L, x =
⊔
K(L)[x].
Proof. Obviously it holds that
⊔
K(L)[x] ⊑ x. We show that x ⊑
⊔
K(L)[x]. By Defini-
tion 4.12, there exists A ⊆ K(L) such that x =
⊔
A. Obviously, A ⊆ K(L)[x]. Therefore, by
Proposition 4.3,
⊔
A ⊑
⊔
K(L)[x] and consequently x ⊑
⊔
K(L)[x].
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Given an algebraic lattice L, the set K(L) will be called the basis of L. If additionally, K(L)
is countable, then L will be called an ω-algebraic lattice.
In the rest of this section we will define a particular class of algebraic lattices that arise
in our semantics of higher-order logic programming. This class will be characterized by
Lemma 4.17 that follows. We first need to define the notion of “step functions” (see for
example [AJ94]) which are used to build the compact elements of our algebraic lattices.
Definition 4.15 Let A be a poset and L be an algebraic lattice. For each a ∈ A and c ∈ K(L),
we define the function (aց c) : A→ L as
(aց c)(x) =
{
c, if a ⊑A x
⊥L, otherwise
The functions of the above form will be called the step functions of A→ L.
Example 4.16 Consider a non-empty set A equipped with the trivial partial order that relates
every element of A to itself, ie., a ⊑A a for all a. Moreover, let L = {0, 1} (which by
Example 4.13 is an algebraic lattice). Then, for every a ∈ A, (a ց 1) is the function that
returns 1 iff its argument is equal to a. In other words (a ց 1) is the singleton set {a}. On
the other hand, for every a, (aց 0) corresponds to the empty set.
As a second example, assume that A is the set of finite subsets of N and that L = {0, 1}.
Then, for any finite set a ∈ A, (a ց 1) is the function that given any finite set x such that
x ⊇ a, (a ց 1)(x) = 1. In other words, (a ց 1) is a set consisting of a and all its (finite)
supersets. On the other hand, for every a, (aց 0) is the function that given any finite set x,
(aց 0)(x) = 0, ie., it corresponds to the empty set (of sets).
The following lemma (which we have not seen explicitly stated before) identifies a class of
algebraic lattices that will play the central role in the development of the semantics of higher-
order logic programming. An important characteristic of these lattices is that they have a
simple characterization of their basis. The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 4.17 Let A be a poset and L be an algebraic lattice. Then, [A
m
→ L] is an algebraic
lattice whose basis is the set of all least upper bounds of finitely many step functions from
A to L. If, additionally, A is countable and L is an ω-algebraic lattice then [A
m
→ L] is an
ω-algebraic lattice.
We can now outline the reasons why algebraic lattices play such an important role in our
context. As we have already mentioned, one of the contributions of the paper is that it al-
lows the treatment of queries with uninstantiated predicate variables. The results of [Wad91]
indicate that (due to continuity), if a relation satisfies a predicate, then some “finite repre-
sentative” of this relation also satisfies it. This gives the idea of defining a semantics which
makes these “finite representatives” more explicit. Intuitively, these finite representatives are
the compact elements of an algebraic lattice. From an operational point of view, restricting
attention to the compact elements allows us to answer queries with uninstantiated variables:
if the set of compact elements is enumerable then we can try them one by one examining in
each case whether the query is satisfied.
More formally, since our lattices are algebraic and satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.17,
we have a relatively easy characterization of their sets of compact elements (as suggested
by Lemma 4.17). Moreover, as we are going to see, if we restrict attention to Herbrand
interpretations (see Section 6), then the lattices that we have to consider are all ω-algebraic
and therefore their sets of compact elements are countable. For these lattices it turns out that
we can devise an effective procedure for enumerating their compact elements which leads us
to an effective proof procedure for our higher-order language.
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5 The Semantics of H
The semantics of H is built upon the notion of algebraic lattice. Recall that an algebraic
lattice is a complete lattice L with the additional property that every element x of L is the
least upper bound of K(L)[x].
5.1 The Semantics of Types
Before specifying the semantics of expressions of H we need to provide the set-theoretic mean-
ing of the types of expressions of H with respect to a set D (where D is later going to be the
domain of our interpretations). The fact that a given type τ denotes a set [[τ ]]D will mean that
an expression of type τ denotes an element of [[τ ]]D. In other words, the semantics of types
help us understand what are the meanings of the expressions of our language. In the following
definition we define simultaneously and recursively two things: the semantics [[τ ]]D of a type
τ and the corresponding partial order ⊑τ
2.
Definition 5.1 Let D be a non-empty set. Then:
• [[ι]]D = D, and ⊑ι is the trivial partial order such that d ⊑ι d, for all d ∈ D.
• [[ιn → ι]]D = D
n → D. A partial order for this case will not be needed.
• [[o]]D = {0, 1}, and ⊑o is the partial order defined by the numerical ordering on {0, 1}.
• [[ι → π]]D = D → [[π]]D, and ⊑ι→π is the partial order defined as follows: for all f, g ∈
[[ι→ π]]D, f ⊑ι→π g if and only if f(d) ⊑π g(d), for all d ∈ D.
• [[π1 → π2]]D = [K([[π1]]D)
m
→ [[π2]]D], and ⊑π1→π2 is the partial order defined as follows:
for all f, g ∈ [[π1 → π2]]D, f ⊑π1→π2 g if and only if f(d) ⊑π2 g(d), for all d ∈ K([[π1]]D).
It is not immediately obvious that the last case in the above definition is well-defined.
More specifically, in order for the quantity K([[π1]]D) to make sense, [[π1]]D must be a complete
lattice. This is ensured by the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2 Let D be a non-empty set. Then, for every π, [[π]]D is an algebraic lattice (ω-
algebraic if D is countable).
Proof. The proof is by a simple induction on the structure of π. The basis case is for π = o
and holds trivially (see Example 4.13). For the induction step, we distinguish two cases.
The first case is for π = ι → π1. Then, [[ι → π1]]D = D → [[π1]]D. Notice now that D is
partially ordered by the trivial partial order ⊑ι, and it holds that D → [[π1]]D = [D
m
→ [[π1]]D]
(monotonicity is trivial in this case). By the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.17 it follows
that [[π]]D is an algebraic lattice (ω-algebraic if D is countable). The second case is for π =
π1 → π2, and the result follows by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.17.
The following definition gives us a convenient shorthand when we want to refer to an object
that is either a compact element or a member of the domain D of our interpretations. This
shorthand will be used in various places of the paper.
2Notice that we are writing ⊑τ instead of the more accurate ⊑[[τ]]
D
. In the following, for brevity reasons we
will often use the former (simpler) notation. Similarly, we will often write ⊥pi instead of ⊥[[pi]]
D
.
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Definition 5.3 Let D be a non-empty set and let ρ be an argument type. Define:
FD(ρ) =
{
D, if ρ = ι
K([[ρ]]D), otherwise
The set FD(ρ) will be called the set of basic elements of type ρ (with respect to the set D).
Example 5.4 Consider the type ι → o (a first-order predicate with one argument has this
type). By Definition 5.1, [[ι→ o]]D is the set of all functions from D to {0, 1} (or equivalently,
of arbitrary subsets of D).
As a second example, consider the type (ι → o) → o. This is the type of a predicate
which takes as its only parameter another predicate which is first-order; for example, p in
Example 2.1 has this type. Then, it can be verified using Lemma 4.17 and Example 4.16 that
the set K([[ι→ o]]D) is the set of all finite functions from D to {0, 1} (or equivalently, of finite
subsets of D). By Definition 5.1, [[(ι → o) → o]]D is the set of all monotonic functions from
finite subsets of D (ie., elements of K([[ι → o]]D)) to {0, 1}. In other words, in the semantics
of H, a predicate of type (ι → o) → o will denote a monotonic function from finite subsets
of D to {0, 1}. The role that monotonicity plays in this context can be intuitively explained
by considering again Example 2.1: if p is true of a finite set, then this set must contain both
0 and s(0). But then, p will also be true for every superset of this set (since every superset
also contains both 0 and s(0)). As we are going to see, the meaning of all the higher-order
predicates that are defined in a program will possess the monotonicity property.
It should be noted at this point that the semantics of types of our language is in some sense a
finitary version of the one given in [Wad91], where the denotation of a type of the form π1 → π2
is the set of all continuous functions from the denotation of π1 to the denotation of π2 (more
details on the connections between the two approaches will be given in Section 5.3). Notice
now that in our interpretation of types, only monotonicity is required; actually, continuity is
not applicable in our interpretation: given a type π1 → π2, it would be meaningless to talk
about the continuous functions from K([[π1]]D) to [[π2]]D because K([[π1]]D) is not in general a
complete lattice3 as required by the definition of continuity. However, as we are going to see,
monotonicity suffices in order to establish that the immediate consequence operator of every
program is continuous (Lemma 6.10) and therefore has a least fixed-point.
As a last remark, we should mention that the interpretation of types given in Definition 5.1,
does not apply to the inverse implication operator←π of H, whose denotation is not monotonic
(for example, notice that negation can be implicitly defined with the use of implication).
However, since the use of ←π is not allowed inside positive expressions, the non-monotonicity
of ←π does not create any semantic problems.
5.2 The Semantics of Expressions
We can now proceed to give meaning to the expressions of H. This is performed by first
defining the notions of interpretation and state for H:
Definition 5.5 An interpretation I of H consists of:
1. a nonempty set D, called the domain of I
2. an assignment to each individual constant symbol c, of an element I(c) ∈ D
3To see this, take pi1 = ι → o and let D be an infinite set. Then, K([[ι → o]]D) consists of all finite subsets
of D and is not a complete lattice (since the least upper bound of a set of finite sets can itself be infinite).
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3. an assignment to each predicate constant p of type π, of an element I(p) ∈ [[π]]D
4. an assignment to each function symbol f of type ιn → ι, of a function I(f) ∈ Dn → D.
Definition 5.6 Let D be a nonempty set. Then, a state s of H over D is a function that
assigns to each argument variable V of type ρ of H an element s(V) ∈ FD(ρ).
In the following, s[d/V] is used to denote a state that is identical to s the only difference
being that the new state assigns to V the value d.
Before we proceed to formally define the semantics of expressions of H, a short discussion
on the semantics of application is needed. The key technical difficulty we have to confront
can be explained by reconsidering Example 2.1 in the more formal context that we have now
developed.
Example 5.7 Consider again the program from Example 2.1:
p(Q):-Q(0),Q(s(0)).
nat(0).
nat(s(X)):-nat(X).
Consider also the query ← p(nat). The type of p is (ι → o) → o, while the type of nat is
ι→ o. Let I be an interpretation with underlying domain D. Then, according to Definition 5.5,
I(p) must be a monotonic function from K([[ι → o]]D) to {0, 1}. Moreover, according to
Example 5.4, FD(ι → o) consists of all the finite sets of elements of D. But I(nat) is a
member of [[ι → o]]D and can therefore be an infinite set. How can we apply I(p) to I(nat)?
To overcome this problem, observe that in order for the predicate p to succeed for its argument
Q, it only has to examine a “finite number of facts” about Q (namely whether Q is true of 0
and s(0)). This remark suggests that the meaning of p(nat) can be established following a
non-standard interpretation of application: we apply I(p) to all the “finite approximations”
of I(nat), ie., to all elements of K([[ι → o]]D)[I(nat)], and then take the least upper bound of
the results. Notice that our approach heavily relies on the fact that our semantic domains are
algebraic lattices: every element of such a lattice (like I(nat) in our example) is the least upper
bound of the compact elements of the lattice that are below it (the finite subsets of I(nat) in
our case).
We can now proceed to present the semantics of H:
Definition 5.8 Let I be an interpretation of H, let D be the domain of I, and let s be a state
over D. Then, the semantics of expressions of H with respect to I and s, is defined as follows:
1. [[0]]s(I) = 0
2. [[1]]s(I) = 1
3. [[c]]s(I) = I(c), for every individual constant c
4. [[p]]s(I) = I(p), for every predicate constant p
5. [[V]]s(I) = s(V), for every argument variable V
6. [[(f E1 · · ·En)]]s(I) = I(f) [[E1]]s(I) · · · [[En]]s(I), for every n-ary function symbol f
7. [[(E1E2)]]s(I) =
⊔
b∈B([[E1]]s(I)(b)), where B = FD(type(E2))[[[E2]]s(I)]
8. [[(λV.E)]]s(I) = λd.[[E]]s[d/V](I), where d ranges over FD(type(V))
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9. [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(I) =
⊔
π{[[E1]]s(I), [[E2]]s(I)}, where
⊔
π is the least upper bound function
on [[π]]D
10. [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(I) =
d
π{[[E1]]s(I), [[E2]]s(I)}, where
d
π is the greatest lower bound function
on [[π]]D
11. [[(E1≈E2)]]s(I) =
{
1, if [[E1]]s(I) = [[E2]]s(I)
0, otherwise
12. [[(∃VE)]]s(I) =
{
1, if there exists d ∈ FD(type(V)) such that [[E]]s[d/V](I) = 1
0, otherwise
13. [[(p←π E)]]s(I) =
{
1, if [[E]]s(I) ⊑π I(p)
0, otherwise
14. [[(← E)]]s(I) =
{
1, if [[E]]s(I) = 0
0, otherwise
For closed expressions E we will often write [[E]](I) instead of [[E]]s(I) (since, in this case,
the meaning of E is independent of s).
We need to demonstrate that the semantic valuation function [[·]] assigns to every expression
of H an element of the corresponding semantic domain. More formally, we need to establish
that for every interpretation I with domain D, for every state s over D and for all expressions
E : ρ, it holds that [[E]]s(I) ∈ [[ρ]]D. In order to prove this, the following definition is needed:
Definition 5.9 Let SH,D be the set of states of H over the nonempty set D. We define the
following partial order on SH,D: for all s1, s2 ∈ SH,D, s1 ⊑SH,D s2 iff for every argument
variable V : ρ of H, s1(V) ⊑ρ s2(V).
The following lemma states that Definition 5.8 assigns to expressions elements of the cor-
responding semantic domain. Notice that in order to establish this, we must also prove si-
multaneously that the meaning of positive expressions is monotonic with respect to states.
Lemma 5.10 Let E : ρ be an expression of H and let D be a nonempty set. Moreover, let
s, s1, s2 be states over D and let I be an interpretation over D. Then:
1. [[E]]s(I) ∈ [[ρ]]D.
2. If E is positive and s1 ⊑SH,D s2 then [[E]]s1(I) ⊑ρ [[E]]s2(I).
The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix B.
We can now define the important notion of a model of a set of formulas:
Definition 5.11 Let S be a set of formulas of H and let I be an interpretation of H. We
say that I is a model of S if for every F ∈ S and for every state s over the domain of I,
[[F]]s(I) = 1.
We close this section with the definitions of the notions of unsatisfiability and of logical con-
sequence of a set of formulas.
Definition 5.12 Let S be a set of formulas of H. We say that S is unsatisfiable if no
interpretation of H is a model for S.
Definition 5.13 Let S be a set of formulas and F a formula of H. We say that F is a logical
consequence of S if, for every interpretation I of H, I is a model of S implies that I is a
model of F.
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5.3 A Comparison with the Continuous Semantics
In this subsection we give a brief comparison of the proposed semantics with the semantics
introduced in [Wad91]. A complete presentation of such a comparison would require a detailed
presentation of the approach introduced in [Wad91] and its adaptation to the richer language
H introduced in this paper. We avoid such an extensive comparison by outlining the main
points in an intuitive way.
As already mentioned, the source language considered in [Wad91] is restricted compared
to H. However, the semantics of [Wad91] can be appropriately extended to apply to H as
well. Given a non-empty set D, let us denote by [[ρ]]∗D the semantics of an argument type ρ in
D under the approach of [Wad91]. Then, the semantics of types is defined as follows:
• [[ι]]∗D = D.
• [[ιn → ι]]∗D = D
n → D.
• [[o]]∗D = {0, 1}.
• [[ι→ π]]∗D = D → [[π]]
∗
D.
• [[π1 → π2]]
∗
D = [[[π1]]
∗
D
c
→ [[π2]]
∗
D].
where by [A
c
→ B] we denote the set of continuous functions from A to B. The corresponding
partial orders can be easily defined as in Definition 5.1. The semantics of expressions can be
defined in an analogous way as in Definition 5.8, the main difference being that the semantics of
application is the standard one. Roughly speaking, one can say that the semantics of [Wad91]
is the logic programming analogue of the standard denotational semantics of functional pro-
gramming languages [Ten91]. In the following, we will refer to the semantics of [Wad91] as
the “continuous semantics”.
It is relatively easy to show that for every argument type ρ of H there is a bijection between
the sets [[ρ]]D and [[ρ]]
∗
D. Similarly, there is a bijection between the set of interpretations of
H under the proposed semantics and the set of interpretations of H under the continuous
semantics. Then, the following proposition can be established:
Proposition 5.14 Let P be a program and let F be a formula of H. Then, F is a logical
consequence of P under the proposed semantics iff F is a logical consequence of P under the
continuous semantics.
In other words, the two semantics, despite their differences, are closely related. The key
advantage of the proposed semantics is that it is much closer to the SLD-resolution proof
procedure that will be introduced in Section 7. More specifically:
• The compact elements of our algebraic lattices correspond to the basic expressions that
are a vital characteristic of the proposed proof procedure (see Subsection 7.1).
• The notion of answer and correct answer for a query (see Definitions 7.16 and 7.17) can
now be accurately defined. Notice that the notion of correct answer must be quite close
to that of computed answer in order to be able to state the main completeness theorem.
In conclusion, the proposed semantics allows us to define an SLD-resolution proof procedure
and it helps us formalize and prove its completeness. It is unclear to us whether (and how)
this could have been accomplished by relying on the continuous semantics.
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6 Minimum Herbrand Model Semantics
Herbrand interpretations constitute a special form of interpretations that have proven to be a
cornerstone of first-order logic programming. Analogously, we have:
Definition 6.1 The Herbrand universe UH of H is the set of all terms that can be formed out
of the individual constants and the function symbols of H.
Definition 6.2 A Herbrand interpretation I of H is an interpretation such that:
1. The domain of I is the Herbrand universe UH of H.
2. For every individual constant c, I(c) = c.
3. For every predicate constant p of type π, I(p) ∈ [[π]]UH.
4. For every n-ary function symbol f and all terms t1, . . . , tn of UH, I(f) t1 · · · tn = f t1 · · · tn.
Since all Herbrand interpretations have the same underlying domain, we will often refer to
a “Herbrand state s”, meaning a state whose underlying domain is UH. As it is a standard
practice in logic programming, we will often refer to an “interpretation of a set of formulas
S” rather than of the underlying language H. In this case, we will implicitly assume that
the set of individual constants and function symbols are those that appear in S. Under this
assumption, we will often talk about the “Herbrand universe US of a set of formulas S”.
We should also note that since the Herbrand universe is a countable set, by Lemma 5.2,
for every predicate type π, [[π]]UH is an ω-algebraic lattice (ie., it has a countable basis).
We can now proceed to examine properties of Herbrand interpretations. In the following
we denote the set of Herbrand interpretations of a program P with IP .
Definition 6.3 Let P be a program. We define the following partial order on IP: for all
I, J ∈ IP, I ⊑IP J iff for every π and for every predicate constant p : π of P, I(p) ⊑π J(p).
Lemma 6.4 Let P be a program and let I ⊆ IP. Then, for every predicate p of P, (
⊔
I)(p) =⊔
I∈I I(p) and (
d
I)(p) =
d
I∈I I(p). Therefore, IP is a complete lattice under ⊑IP.
Proof. We give the proof for
⊔
; the proof for
d
is symmetrical and omitted. Let J ∈ IP
such that for every p : π in P, J(p) =
⊔
I∈I I(p). Notice that
⊔
I∈I I(p) is well-defined since
[[π]]UP is a complete lattice. Notice also that J is an upper-bound for I because for every I ∈ I,
I ⊑IP J . Let J
′ be an arbitrary upper bound of I. Then, for every p : π, it holds that J ′(p)
is an upper bound of {I(p) | I ∈ I}, and therefore
⊔
I∈I I(p) ⊑π J
′(p), which implies that
J ⊑IP J
′.
In the following we denote with ⊥IP the greatest lower bound of IP, ie., the interpretation
which for every π, assigns to each predicate p : π of P the element ⊥π.
The properties of monotonicity and continuity of the semantic valuation function will prove
vital:
Lemma 6.5 (Monotonicity of Semantics) Let P be a program and let E : ρ be a positive
expression of P. Let I, J be Herbrand interpretations and s a Herbrand state of P. If I ⊑IP J
then [[E]]s(I) ⊑ρ [[E]]s(J).
The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix C.
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Lemma 6.6 (Continuity of Semantics) Let P be a program and let E be a positive expres-
sion of P. Let I be a directed set of Herbrand interpretations and s a Herbrand state of P.
Then, [[E]]s(
⊔
I) =
⊔
I∈I [[E]]s(I).
The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix D.
All the basic properties of first-order logic programming extend naturally to the higher-
order case:
Theorem 6.7 (Model Intersection Theorem) Let P be a program and M a non-empty
set of Herbrand models of P. Then,
d
M is a Herbrand model for P.
Proof. By Lemma 6.4,
d
M is well-defined. Assume that
d
M is not a model for P.
Then, there exists a rule p ←π E in P and b1, . . . , bn of the appropriate types such that
(
d
M)(p) b1 · · · bn = 0 while [[E]](
d
M) b1 · · · bn = 1. Since for every M ∈ M we haved
M⊑M , using Lemma 6.5 we conclude that for allM ∈M, [[E]](M) b1 · · · bn = 1. Moreover,
since (
d
M)(p) b1 · · · bn = 0, by Lemma 6.4 we get that (
d
M(p)) b1 · · · bn = 0. By Proposi-
tion 4.10 we conclude that for someM ∈M, M(p) b1 · · · bn = 0. But then there existsM ∈ M
that does not satisfy the rule p←π E, and therefore is not a model of P (contradiction).
It is straightforward to check that every higher-order program P has at least one Herbrand
model I, namely the one which for every predicate constant p of P and for all basic elements
b1, . . . , bn of the appropriate types, I(p) b1 · · · bn = 1. Notice that this model generalizes the
familiar idea of “Herbrand Base” that is used in the theory of first-order logic programming.
Since the set of models of a higher-order logic program is non-empty, the intersection (glb)
of all Herbrand models is well-defined, and by the above theorem is a model of the program.
We will denote this model by MP.
Definition 6.8 Let P be a program. The mapping TP : IP → IP is defined as follows for every
p : π in P and for every I ∈ IP:
TP(I)(p) =
⊔
(p←piE)∈P
[[E]](I)
The mapping TP will be called the immediate consequence operator for P.
The fact that TP is well-defined is verified by the following lemma:
Lemma 6.9 Let P be a program and let p : π be a predicate constant of P. Then, for every
I ∈ IP, TP(I)(p) ∈ [[π]]UP.
Proof. The result follows directly by the definition of TP, Lemma 5.10 and the fact that
[[π]]UP is a complete lattice.
The key property of TP is that it is continuous:
Lemma 6.10 Let P be a program. Then the mapping TP is continuous.
Proof. Straightforward using Lemma 6.6.
The following property of TP generalizes the corresponding well-known property from first-
order logic programming:
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Lemma 6.11 Let P be a program and let I ∈ IP. Then I is a model of P if and only if
TP(I) ⊑IP I.
Proof. An interpretation I ∈ IP is a model of P iff [[E]](I) ⊑π I(p) for every clause p ←π E
in P iff
⊔
(p←piE)∈P
[[E]](I) ⊑π I(p) iff TP(I)(p) ⊑π I(p).
Define now the following sequence of interpretations:
TP ↑ 0 = ⊥IP
TP ↑ (n + 1) = TP(TP ↑ n)
TP ↑ ω =
⊔
{TP ↑ n | n < ω}
We have the following theorem (which is entirely analogous to the one for the first-order case):
Theorem 6.12 Let P be a program. Then MP = lfp(TP) = TP ↑ ω.
Proof. Using exactly the same reasoning as in the first-order case (see for example the
corresponding proof in [Llo87]).
7 Proof Procedure
In this section we propose a sound and complete proof-procedure for H. One important aspect
we initially have to resolve, is how to represent basic elements (see Definition 5.3) in our source
language. In the following subsection we introduce a class of positive expressions, namely basic
expressions, which are the syntactic analogues of basic elements. Basic expressions will be used
in order to formalize the notion of answer (to a given query) as-well-as in our development of
the SLD-resolution for H.
7.1 Basic Expressions
As we have already seen, basic elements have played an important role in the development of
the semantics of our higher-order logic programming language. In order to devise a sound and
complete proof procedure for our language, we first need to find a syntactic representation for
basic elements. Since the definition of basic elements uses the operator ⊑ (see Lemma 4.17,
Definition 4.15 and Definition 5.3), it is not immediately obvious how one can construct a
positive expression whose meaning coincides with a given basic element. Basic expressions
introduced below, solve this apparent difficulty:
Definition 7.1 The set of basic expressions of H is recursively defined as follows. Every
expression of H of type ι is a basic expression of type ι. Every predicate variable of H of type
π is a basic expression of type π. The propositional constants 0 and 1 are basic expressions of
type o. A non-empty finite union of expressions each one of which has the following form, is
a basic expression of type ρ1 → · · · → ρn → o (where V1 : ρ1, . . . ,Vn : ρn):
1. λV1. · · · λVn.0
2. λV1. · · · λVn.(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An), where each Ai is either
(a) (Vi ≈ Bi), if Vi : ι and Bi : ι is a basic expression where Vj 6∈ FV (Bi) for all j, or
(b) the constant 1 or Vi, if Vi : o, or
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(c) the constant 1 or Vi(B11) · · · (B1r)∧· · ·∧Vi(Bm1) · · · (Bmr), m > 0, if type(Vi) 6= ι, o
and the Bkl’s are basic expressions of the appropriate types, where Vj 6∈ FV (Bkl)
for all j, k, l.
The Bi and Bkl above will be called the basic subexpressions of B.
The following example illustrates the ideas behind the above definition.
Example 7.2 We consider various cases of the above definition:
• The terms a, f(a,b), X and f(X,h(Y)), are basic expressions of type ι.
• Assume X : ρ. Then, λX.0 is a basic expression of type ρ→ o. Intuitively, it corresponds
to the basic element ⊥ρ→o.
• Assume X : ι. Then, λX.(X≈a) is a basic expression of type ι → o. Intuitively, it
corresponds to the basic element (aց 1) or more simply to the finite set {a}.
• Assume X : ι and Y : ι. Then, λX.λY.(X≈a)∧(Y≈b) is a basic expression of type
ι→ ι→ o. Intuitively, it corresponds to the basic element (aց (bց 1)) or more simply
to the singleton binary relation {(a, b)}.
• Assume X : ι. Then, (λX.(X≈a))
∨
ι→o(λX.(X≈b)) is a basic expression of type ι→ o.
It corresponds to the basic element
⊔
{(a ց 1), (b ց 1)}, or more simply to the finite
set {a, b}.
• Assume Q : ι → o. Then, λQ.(Q(a)∧Q(b))is a basic expression of type (ι → o) → o.
Intuitively, it corresponds to the basic element (
⊔
{(aց 1), (bց 1)})ց 1. More simply,
it corresponds to the set of all finite sets that contain both a and b.
The proof procedure that will be developed later in this section, relies on a special form of
basic expressions:
Definition 7.3 The set of basic templates of H is the subset of the set of basic expressions
of H defined as follows:
• The propositional constants 0 and 1 are basic templates.
• Every non-empty finite union of basic expressions (of the form presented in items 1 and
2 of Definition 7.1) in which all the basic subexpressions involved are distinct variables,
is a basic template.
The variables mentioned above, will be called template variables.
Example 7.4 Assume in the following expressions that X, Y, Z, W : ι, Q, Q1, Q2 : ι → o and
R : ((ι → o) → o) → o. The expression λX.(X≈Z) is a basic template of type ι → o.
The expression λX.λY.(X≈Z)∧(Y≈W) is a basic template of type ι → ι → o; the template
variables in this case are Z and W. The expression λQ.(Q(Z)∧Q(W))is a basic template of type
(ι → o) → o with template variables Z and W. The expression λR.(R(Q1)∧R(Q2)) is a basic
template of type ((ι→ o)→ o)→ o with template variables Q1 and Q2.
20
Notice from the above example that the structure of basic templates is in general much simpler
than that of basic expressions (due to the fact that a template variable can represent an
arbitrary basic expression of the same type). For this reason, basic templates are much simpler
to enumerate than arbitrary basic expressions.
The following two lemmas establish the connections between basic elements and basic
expressions.
Lemma 7.5 For every basic expression B : ρ, for every Herbrand interpretation I of H, and
for every Herbrand state s, [[B]]s(I) ∈ FUH(ρ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the type of B. The basis case is for basic expressions of
type ι and o and holds trivially. We demonstrate that the lemma holds for basic expressions
of type ρ = ρ1 → · · · → ρn → o, assuming that it holds for all basic expressions that have
simpler types than ρ. If the basic expression is a predicate variable, the result is immediate;
otherwise, we have to distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: B = λV1. · · · λVn.0. Then, the corresponding basic element in FUH(ρ) is the bottom
element of type ρ1 → · · · → ρn → o (ie., ⊥ρ1→···→ρn→o).
Case 2: B = λV1. · · · λVn.(A1∧· · ·∧An). Then, the corresponding basic element is the element
b1 ց (b2 ց · · · ց (bn ց 1) · · · ), where the bi are defined as follows:
• If Vi : ι, then by Definition 7.1, Ai = (Vi ≈ Bi). In this case, bi = [[Bi]]s(I).
• If Vi : o then Ai is either equal to 1 or to Vi; in the former case bi = 0 and in the latter
case bi = 1.
• If Vi is of any other type then Ai is either equal to 1 or to Vi(B11) · · · (B1r) ∧ · · · ∧
Vi(Bm1) · · · (Bmr), where m > 0. In the former case it is bi = 0; in the latter case
bi =
⊔
1≤j≤m([[Bj1]]s(I)ց ([[Bj2]]s(I)ց · · · ց ([[Bjr]]s(I)ց 1) · · · )).
Case 3: B is a finite union of lambda abstractions. Then, for each term of the finite union we
can create (as above) a basic element. By taking the finite union of these elements, we create
the basic element that corresponds to B.
It can be easily verified that for every basic expression B, [[B]]s(I) coincides with the cor-
responding basic element defined as above.
The converse of the above lemma holds, as the following lemma demonstrates.
Lemma 7.6 Let ρ be any argument type and let b ∈ FUH(ρ). Then, there exists a closed basic
expression B : ρ such that for every Herbrand interpretation I, [[B]](I) = b.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of argument types. The basis case is for
argument types ι and o, and holds trivially. We demonstrate that the lemma holds for type
ρ = ρ1 → · · · → ρn → o, assuming that it holds for all subtypes of ρ. Assume now that b is a
basic element of type ρ, consisting of a finite union of step functions.
If the union is empty, then B = λV1. · · · λVn.0. Assume now that the union is non-empty.
Then, the basic expression corresponding to b will simply be the union of the basic expressions
corresponding to the step functions that comprise b.
Let b1 ց (b2 ց · · · ց (bn ց 1) · · · ) be one of the step functions that constitute b. We
create the basic expression: B = λV1. · · ·λVn.(A1 ∧ · · ·An) where each Ai can be created as
follows:
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• If bi is of type ι and bi = t ∈ UH, then Ai = (Vi ≈ t).
• If bi is of type o and bi = 0, then Ai = 1.
• If bi is of type o and bi = 1, then Ai = 0.
• Otherwise, bi is a finite union of m > 0 basic elements of the form bj1 ց (bj2 ց · · · ց
(bjr ց 1) · · · ), 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then, Ai = Vi(B11) · · · (B1r) ∧ · · · ∧ Vi(Bm1) · · · (Bmr),
where Bj1, . . . ,Bjm are the expressions that correspond (by the induction hypothesis) to
bj1, . . . , bjm.
It is easy to verify that the resulting basic expression B satisfies [[B]](I) = b.
The above two lemmas suggest that basic expressions are the syntactic analogues of basic
elements.
7.2 Substitutions and Unifiers
Substitutions are vital in the development of the proof procedure for H:
Definition 7.7 A substitution θ is a finite set of the form {V1/E1, . . . ,Vn/En}, where the Vi’s
are different argument variables of H and each Ei is a positive expression of H having the same
type as Vi. We write dom(θ) = {V1, . . . ,Vn} and range(θ) = {E1, . . . ,En}. A substitution is
called basic if all Ei are basic expressions. A substitution is called zero-order, if type(Vi) = ι,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (notice that every zero-order substitution is also basic). The substitution
corresponding to the empty set will be called the identity substitution and will be denoted by ǫ.
We are now ready to define what it means to apply a substitution θ to an expression E. Such
definitions are usually complicated by the fact that one has to often rename the bound variable
before applying θ to the body of a lambda abstraction. In order to simplify matters, we follow
the simple approach suggested in [Bar84][pages 26-27], which consists of the following two
conventions:
• The α-congruence convention: Expressions that are α-congruent will be considered
identical (expression E1 is α-congruent with expression E2 if E2 results from E1 by a
series of changes of bound variables). For example, λQ.Q(a) is α-congruent to λR.R(a).
• The variable convention: If expressions E1, . . . ,En occur in a certain mathematical
context (eg., definition, proof), then in these expressions all bound variables are chosen
to be different from the free variables.
Using the variable convention, we have the following simple definition:
Definition 7.8 Let θ be a substitution and let E be a positive expression. Then, Eθ is an
expression obtained from E as follows:
• Eθ = E, if E is 0, 1, c, or p.
• Vθ = θ(V) if V ∈ dom(θ); otherwise, Vθ = V.
• (f E1 · · ·En)θ = (f E1θ · · ·Enθ).
• (E1E2)θ = (E1θ E2θ).
• (λV.E1)θ = (λV.(E1θ)).
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• (E1
∨
π E2)θ = (E1θ
∨
π E2θ).
• (E1
∧
π E2)θ = (E1θ
∧
π E2θ).
• (E1 ≈ E2)θ = (E1θ ≈ E2θ).
• (∃VE1)θ = (∃V (E1θ)).
Notice that in the case of lambda abstraction (and similarly in the case of existential
quantification), it is not needed to say “provided V 6∈ FV (range(θ)) and V 6∈ dom(θ)”. By
the variable convention this is the case.
Definition 7.9 Let θ = {V1/E1, . . . ,Vm/Em} and σ = {V
′
1/E
′
1, . . . ,V
′
n/E
′
n} be substitutions.
Then the composition θσ of θ and σ is the substitution obtained from the set
{V1/E1σ, . . . ,Vm/Emσ,V
′
1/E
′
1, . . . ,V
′
n/E
′
n}
by deleting any Vi/Eiσ for which Vi = Eiσ and deleting any V
′
j/E
′
j for which V
′
j ∈ {V1, . . . ,Vm}.
The following proposition is easy to establish:
Proposition 7.10 Let θ, σ and γ be substitutions. Then:
1. θǫ = ǫθ = θ.
2. For all positive expressions E, (Eθ)σ = E(θσ).
3. (θσ)γ = θ(σγ).
We will use the notions of unifier and most general unifier, which in our case have exactly the
same meaning as in the case of classical (first-order) logic programming:
Definition 7.11 Let S be a set of terms of H (ie., expressions of type ι). A zero-order
substitution θ will be called a unifier of the expressions in S if the set Sθ = {Eθ | E ∈ S} is a
singleton. The substitution θ will be called a most general unifier of S (denoted by mgu(S)),
if for every unifier σ of the expressions in S, there exists a zero-order substitution γ such that
σ = θγ.
We now have the following Substitution Lemma (see for example [Ten91] for a corresponding
lemma in the case of functional programming). The Substitution Lemma shows that given a
basic substitution θ, the meaning of Eθ is that of E in a certain state definable from θ. The
lemma will be later used in the proof of soundness of the proposed proof procedure.
Lemma 7.12 (Substitution Lemma) Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P
and let s be a state over the domain of I. Let θ be a basic substitution and E be a positive
expression. Then, [[Eθ]]s(I) = [[E]]s′(I), where s
′(V) = [[θ(V)]]s(I) if V ∈ dom(θ) and s
′(V) =
s(V), otherwise.
Proof. By structural induction on E.
The following lemmas, that also involve the notion of substitution, can be easily demonstrated
and will prove useful in the sequel.
Lemma 7.13 Let θ1, . . . , θn be basic substitutions. Then, θ1 · · · θn is also a basic substitution.
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Proof. By induction on n and using Definitions 7.1 and 7.9.
Lemma 7.14 Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P and let s be a state over the
domain of I. Let λV.E1 and E2 be positive expressions of type ρ→ π and ρ respectively. Then,
[[(λV.E1)E2]]s(I) = [[E1{V/E2}]]s(I).
Proof. By structural induction on E1.
Lemma 7.15 Let P be a program, I a Herbrand interpretation of P and s a Herbrand state.
Let E be a positive expression. Then, there exists a basic substitution θ such that [[E]]s(I) =
[[Eθ]]s′(I) for every Herbrand state s
′.
Proof. Define θ such that if V ∈ FV (E), θ(V) = B, where B is a closed basic expression such
that [[B]](I) = s(V) (the existence of such a B is ensured by Lemma 7.6). The lemma follows
by a structural induction on E.
It is important to note that in the rest of the paper, the substitutions that we will use will be
basic ones (unless otherwise stated). Actually, the only place where a non-basic substitution
will be needed, is when we perform a β-reduction step (see for example the rule for λ in the
forthcoming Definition 7.18).
7.3 SLD-Resolution
We now proceed to define the notions of answer and correct answer.
Definition 7.16 Let P be a program and G a goal. An answer for P∪{G} is a basic substitution
for (certain of the) free variables of G.
Definition 7.17 Let P be a program, G =← A a goal clause and θ an answer for P ∪ {G}.
We say that θ is a correct answer for P ∪ {G} if for every model M of P and for every state
s over the domain of M , [[Aθ]]s(M) = 1.
Definition 7.18 Let P be a program and let G =← A and G′ =← A′ be goal clauses. Then,
we say that A′ is derived in one step from A using basic substitution θ (or equivalently that
G′ is derived in one step from G using θ), and we denote this fact by A
θ
→ A′ (respectively,
G
θ
→ G′) if one of the following conditions applies:
1. p E1 · · ·En
ǫ
→ E E1 · · · En, where p←π E is a rule in P.
2. Q E1 · · ·En
θ
→ (Q E1 · · · En)θ, where θ = {Q/Bt} and Bt a basic template.
3. (λV.E) E1 · · ·En
ǫ
→ (E{V/E1})E2 · · ·En.
4. (E′
∨
π E
′′) E1 · · ·En
ǫ
→ E′ E1 · · ·En.
5. (E′
∨
π E
′′) E1 · · ·En
ǫ
→ E′′ E1 · · ·En.
6. (E′
∧
π E
′′) E1 · · ·En
ǫ
→ (E′ E1 · · ·En) ∧ (E
′′ E1 · · ·En), where π 6= o.
7. (E1 ∧ E2)
θ
→ (E′1 ∧ (E2θ)), if E1
θ
→ E′1.
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8. (E1 ∧ E2)
θ
→ ((E1θ) ∧ E
′
2), if E2
θ
→ E′2.
9. (✷ ∧ E)
ǫ
→ E
10. (E ∧ ✷)
ǫ
→ E
11. (E1 ≈ E2)
θ
→ ✷, where θ is an mgu of E1 and E2.
12. (∃VE)
ǫ
→ E
Moreover, we write A
θ
։ A′ if A = A0
θ1→ A1
θ2→ · · ·
θn→ An = A
′, n ≥ 1, where θ = θ1 · · · θn (and
similarly for G
θ
։ G′).
Definition 7.19 Let P be a program and G a goal. An SLD-derivation of P∪{G} is a (finite or
infinite) sequence G0 = G,G1, . . . of goals and a sequence θ1, θ2, . . . of basic substitutions such
that each Gi+1 is derived in one step from Gi using θi+1. Moreover, for all i, if θi = {V/Bt},
then the free variables of Bt are disjoint from all the variables that have already appeared in
the derivation up to Gi−1.
Definition 7.20 Let P be a program and G a goal. Assume that P ∪ {G} has a finite SLD-
derivation G0 = G,G1, . . . ,Gn with basic substitutions θ1, . . . , θn, such that Gn = ✷. Then, we
will say that P∪ {G} has an SLD-refutation of length n using basic substitution θ = θ1 · · · θn.
Definition 7.21 Let P be a program, G a goal and assume that P∪{G} has an SLD-refutation
using basic substitution θ. Then, a computed answer σ for P ∪ {G} is the basic substitution
obtained by restricting θ to the free variables of G.
Example 7.22 Consider the program of Example 3.6. An SLD-refutation of the goal ←
closure Q a b is given below (where we have omitted certain simple steps involving lambda
abstractions):
closure Q a b θ1 = ǫ
(λR.λX.λY.(R X Y)) Q a b θ2 = ǫ
Q a b θ3 = {Q/(λX.λY.(X≈X0)∧(Y≈Y0))}
(λX.λY.(X≈X0)∧(Y≈Y0)) a b θ4 = ǫ
(a≈X0)∧(b≈Y0) θ5 = {X0/a}
∧(b≈Y0) θ6 = ǫ
(b≈Y0) θ7 = {Y0/b}

If we restrict the composition θ1 · · · θ7 to the free variables of the goal, we get the computed
answer σ1 = {Q/λX.λY.(X≈a)∧(Y≈b)}. Intuitively, σ1 assigns to Q the relation {(a, b)} (for
which the query is obviously true). Notice that by substituting Q with different basic templates,
one can get answers that are “similar” to the above one, such as for example {(a, b), (Z1, Z2)}
or {(a, b), (Z1, Z2), (Z3, Z4)}, and so on. Answers of this type are in some sense “represented”
by the answer {(a, b)}. Actually, one can easily optimize the proof procedure so as to avoid
enumerating such superfluous answers (see the discussion in Section 9).
However, there exist other answers to our original query that are genuinely different from
{(a, b)} and can be obtained by making different clause choices. For example, another an-
swer to our query is σ2 = {Q/(λX.λY.(X≈a)∧(Y≈Z))
∨
π (λX.λY.(X≈Z)∧(Y≈b))}, which
corresponds to the relations of the form {(a, Z), (Z, b)}, for every Z in the Herbrand universe.
Similarly, one can get the answer {(a, Z1), (Z1, Z2), (Z2, b)}, and so on.
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In other words, we observe that by performing different choices in the selection of a basic
template for Q and making an appropriate use of the two rules of the program for closure, we
get an infinite (but countable) number of computed answers to our original query.
7.4 Soundness of SLD-resolution
In this subsection we establish the soundness of the SLD-resolution proof procedure. The
following lemmas are very useful in the proof of the soundness theorem:
Lemma 7.23 Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P and let s be a state over the
domain of I. Let E1 and E2 be positive expressions of type ρ→ π and E expression of type ρ.
If [[E1]]s(I) ⊑ρ→π [[E2]]s(I), then [[(E1 E)]]s(I) ⊑π [[(E2 E)]]s(I).
Proof. Straightforward using the definition of application.
Lemma 7.24 Let P be a program, let G =← A and G′ =← A′ be goals and let θ be a basic
substitution such that A
θ
→ A′. Then, for every model M of P and for every state s over the
domain of M , it holds that [[Aθ]]s(M) ⊒ [[A
′]]s(M).
Proof. First, observe that in all cases A is of the form E E1 · · ·Ek, k ≥ 0, where E is an
expression of predicate type. We perform a structural induction on E.
Induction Basis: We distinguish two cases, namely E = p and E = Q. For the first case it
suffices to show that [[(pE1 · · · Ek)θ]]s(M) ⊒ [[(Ep E1 · · ·Ek)θ]]s(M), where θ = ǫ and p←π Ep is
a clause in P. This follows easily by the fact that M is a model of P and using Lemma 7.23.
The second case is trivial.
Induction Step: We examine the two most interesting cases (the rest are straightforward):
Case 1: E = (λV.E′). In this case θ is the empty substitution, and therefore it suffices to
show that [[(λV.E′)E1 · · ·Ek]]s(M) ⊒ [[E
′{V/E1}E2 · · ·Ek]]s(M). By Lemma 7.14 we have that
[[(λV.E′)E1]]s(M) = [[E
′{V/E1}]]s(M), and the result follows by Lemma 7.23.
Case 2: E = (E′ ∧ E′′). Moreover, assume that E′
θ
→ E′1. Then, (E
′ ∧ E′′) derives in one step
the expression (E′1 ∧ (E
′′θ)). It suffices to show that [[(E′ ∧ E′′)θ]]s(M) ⊒ [[E
′
1 ∧ (E
′′θ)]]s(M),
or equivalently that [[(E′θ) ∧ (E′′θ)]]s(M) ⊒ [[E
′
1 ∧ (E
′′θ)]]s(M). But this holds since by the
induction hypothesis we have that [[E′θ]]s(M) ⊒ [[E
′
1]]s(M).
Lemma 7.25 Let P be a program and G =← A be a goal. Let G0 = G,G1 =← A1, . . . ,Gn =←
An be an SLD-refutation of length n using basic substitutions θ1, . . . , θn. Then, for every model
M of P and for every state s over the domain of M , [[Aθ1 · · · θn]]s(M) ⊒ [[An]]s(M).
Proof. Using Lemma 7.24, Lemma 7.12 and induction on n.
Theorem 7.26 (Soundness) Let P be a program and G =← A a goal. Then, every computed
answer for P ∪ {G} is a correct answer for P ∪ {G}.
Proof. The result is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.25 for Gn = ✷.
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7.5 Completeness of SLD-resolution
In order to establish the completeness of the proposed SLD-resolution, we need to first demon-
strate a result that is analogous to the lifting lemma of the first-order case (see [Llo87]). We
first state (and prove in the appendix) a more technical lemma, which has as a special case
the desired lifting lemma.
In the rest of this subsection, whenever we refer to a “substitution” we mean a “basic
substitution”.
Lemma 7.27 Let P be a program, G a goal and θ a substitution. Suppose that there exists
an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ} using substitution σ. Then, there exists an SLD-refutation
of P ∪ {G} using a substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds that δγ ⊇ θσ and
dom(δγ − θσ) is a (possibly empty) set of template variables that are introduced during the
refutation of P ∪ {G}.
The proof of the above lemma is by a straightforward (but tedious) induction on the length
of the SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ}, and is given in Appendix E.
Lemma 7.28 (Lifting Lemma) Let P be a program, G a goal and θ a substitution. Suppose
that there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ} using substitution σ. Then, there exists an
SLD-refutation of P ∪ {G} using a substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds that
Gδγ = Gθσ.
Proof. By Lemma 7.27, δγ and θσ differ only in template variables that are introduced
during the refutation. By the restriction mentioned in Definition 7.19, these variables are
different from the variables in the goal G. Therefore, δγ and θσ agree on the expressions they
assign to the free variables of G.
Notice that the above lifting lemma differs slightly from the corresponding lemma for
classical logic programming, where we actually have the equality δγ = θσ. This difference is
due to the existence of template variables in the higher-order resolution proof procedure. Of
course, if we restrict the higher-order proof procedure to apply to first-order logic programs,
then it behaves like classical SLD-resolution and the usual lifting lemma holds.
Example 7.29 Consider any program P of our higher-order language and consider the goal
clause G =← R(Z), where Z is of type ι and R of type ι → o. Let θ = {R/λX.(X ≈ a), Z/a}.
Then, Gθ =← (λX.(X ≈ a))(a). We have the following SLD-refutation:
(λX.(X ≈ a))(a)
ǫ
→ (a ≈ a)
ǫ
→ ✷
Therefore, Gθ has an SLD-refutation with substitution σ = ǫ. On the other hand, we have the
following SLD-refutation of G:
R(Z)
{R/λX.(X ≈ X0)}
→ (λX.(X ≈ X0))(Z)
ǫ
→ (Z ≈ X0)
{X0/Z}
→ ✷
Therefore, G has an SLD-refutation with substitution δ which is equal to the composition
of the substitutions {R/λX.(X ≈ X0)}, ǫ and {X0/Z}, ie., δ = {R/λX.(X ≈ Z), X0/Z}. Let
γ = {Z/a}. Then, δγ = {R/λX.(X ≈ a), X0/a, Z/a} while θ = {R/λX.(X ≈ a), Z/a}. We see
that δγ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ − θσ) = {X0} (which is a template variable). Moreover, it holds
Gθσ = Gδγ.
Before we derive the first completeness result, we need certain definitions and lemmas.
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Definition 7.30 Let P be a program and let E be a positive expression or a goal clause. We
define SE to be the set of all expressions that can be obtained from E by substituting zero or
more occurrences of every predicate constant p in E with the expression E1
∨
π · · ·
∨
π Ek, where
p ←π Ei are all the clauses
4 for p in P. Moreover, Ê ∈ SE is the expression obtained from E
by substituting every predicate symbol occurrence with the corresponding expression.
Lemma 7.31 Let P be a program, E a positive expression or a goal clause, I a Herbrand
interpretation of P and s a Herbrand state. Then, [[E]]s(TP(I)) = [[Ê]]s(I).
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on E. Assume that E is a positive expression (the
proof for the case of goal clause is similar). For the induction basis we need to consider the cases
where E is an argument variable V, an individual constant c, a propositional constant (0, 1), or
a predicate constant p. Except for the last one, all other cases are straightforward because the
meaning of E is independent of TP(I) and I. For the last case assume that E1, . . . ,Ek are all the
bodies of the rules defining p in P. By definition of the TP operator, it holds that [[p]]s(TP(I)) =⊔
(p←piEi)∈P
[[Ei]]s(I). Moreover, [[Ê]]s(I) = [[E1
∨
π · · ·
∨
π Ek]]s(I) =
⊔
(p←piEi)∈P
[[Ei]]s(I). This
completes the basis case. For the induction step, all cases are immediate.
Lemma 7.32 Let P a program, G,G′ goals and G′ ∈ SG. If G
′ θ→ H′ then G
θ
։ H, where
H′ ∈ SH.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number m of top-level subexpressions of the goal
G that are connected with the logical constant ∧. The basis case is for m = 1, ie., it applies
to goal clauses G that do not contain a top-level ∧. Assume that G =← A. The cases we
need to examine for A for the induction basis are the following: (p A1 · · ·An), (QA1, . . .An),
((λV.A′) A1 · · ·An), ((A
′
∨
π A
′′) A1 · · ·An), ((A
′
∧
π A
′′) A1 · · ·An), (A1 ≈ A2), and (∃VA). The
only non-trivial case is A = (p A1 · · ·An), which we demonstrate. Assume that p is defined
in P with a set of k rules with right-hand sides E1, . . . ,Ek. Let Ep = E1
∨
π · · ·
∨
π Ek. Since
G =← (pA1 · · ·An), we have that G
′ =← (A′ A′1 · · ·A
′
n), with A
′ ∈ Sp,A
′
1 ∈ SA1 , . . . ,A
′
n ∈ SAn .
We distinguish three cases for A′:
• A′ = p. Then G′
ǫ
→ H′, where H′ =← (Ej A
′
1 · · ·A
′
n) for some j. We also have that G
ǫ
→ H,
where H =← (Ej A1 · · ·An). Obviously, it holds that H
′ ∈ SH.
• A′ = Ep and Ep contains more than one disjunct. Then G
′ ǫ→ H′, where H′ =←
(Ej A
′
1 · · ·A
′
n). We also have that G
ǫ
→ H, where H =← (Ej A1 · · ·An). Again, it holds
that H′ ∈ SH.
• A′ = Ep and Ep contains exactly one disjunct. Then this disjunct must be a lambda
abstraction of the form (λV.A′′). This implies that G′ =← ((λV.A′′)A′1 · · ·A
′
n) and G
′ ǫ→
H′, where H′ =← (A′′{V/A′1}A
′
2 · · ·A
′
n). On the other hand, G
ǫ
→ H1, where H1 =←
((λV.A′′)A1 · · ·An), and H1
ǫ
→ H, where H =← (A′′{V/A1}A2 · · ·An). Therefore, G
ǫ
։ H
where H′ ∈ SH.
The above completes the proof for the basis case. For the induction step, the goal must be
of the form G =← (A1 ∧ A2). Then, G
′ =← (A′1 ∧ A
′
2) where A
′
1 ∈ SA1 and A
′
2 ∈ SA2 . Since
G′
θ
→ H′, we conclude without loss of generality that A′1
θ
→ H′1 and H
′ =← (H′1 ∧ A
′
2θ). By the
4We may assume without loss of generality that each predicate symbol p that is used in P, has a definition
in P: if no such definition exists, we can add to the program the clause p ←pi E, where E is a basic expression
corresponding to the basic element ⊥pi.
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induction hypothesis, since A′1
θ
→ H′1, we get that A1
θ
։ H1, where H
′
1 ∈ SH1 . But then this
easily implies that (A1 ∧ A2)
θ
։ (H1 ∧ A2θ), ie., G
θ
։ H, where H′ ∈ SH. This completes the
proof for the induction step and the lemma.
Lemma 7.33 Let P be a program, G,G′ goals and G′ ∈ SG. If there exists an SLD-refutation
for P ∪ {G′} using substitution θ, then there also exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} using
the same substitution θ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length n of the refutation of P∪{G′}. The induction
basis is for n = 1 and includes the following cases for G: (✷∧✷), (✷∨E1), (E1∨✷), (E1 ≈ E2),
((λV.✷)E) and (∃V✷). It can be easily verified that the lemma holds for all these cases.
Suppose now that the result holds for n − 1. We demonstrate that it also holds for n.
Let G′ = G′0,G
′
1, . . . ,G
′
n be the derived goals of the SLD-refutation of G
′ using the sequence
of substitutions θ1, . . . , θn. Since G
′ θ1→ G′1, by Lemma 7.32 there exists a goal G1 such that
G
θ1
։ G1 and G
′
1 ∈ SG1 . By the induction hypothesis, P ∪ {G1} has an SLD-refutation using
θ2 · · · θn. It follows that P ∪ {G} also has an SLD-refutation using θ = θ1 · · · θn.
Corollary 7.34 Let P be a program and G a goal. If there exists an SLD-refutation for
P ∪ {Ĝ} using substitution θ, then there also exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} using the
same substitution θ.
Lemma 7.35 Let P be a program and G =← A be a goal such that [[A]]s(⊥IP) = 1 for all
Herbrand states s. Then, there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} with computed answer
equal to the identity substitution.
The proof of the lemma can be found in Appendix F.
As in the first-order case, we have various forms of completeness. We can now prove the
analogue of a theorem due to Apt and van Emden (see [Apt90][Lemma 3.17] or [Llo87][Theorem
8.3]).
Theorem 7.36 Let P be a program, G =← A a goal and assume that [[A]]s(MP) = 1 for all
Herbrand states s. Then, there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} with computed answer
equal to the identity substitution.
Proof. We prove by induction on n that if [[A]]s(TP ↑ n) = 1 for all Herbrand states s, then
P ∪ {G} has an SLD-refutation with computed answer equal to the identity substitution. For
n = 0 the proof is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.35.
Now suppose that the result holds for n− 1. For the induction step assume that [[A]]s(TP ↑
n) = 1 for all s. By Lemma 7.31, [[Â]]s(TP ↑ (n− 1)) = 1. By the induction hypothesis there
exists an SLD-refutation for P∪{Ĝ} with computed answer equal to the identity substitution.
Let θ be the composition of the substitutions that are used during the SLD-refutation of
P∪{Ĝ}. By Corollary 7.34, P∪{G} also has an SLD-refutation using the same substitution θ.
The restriction of θ to the free variables of G is equal to the restriction of θ to the free variables
of Ĝ which is equal to the empty substitution. Therefore, P∪ {G} has an SLD-refutation with
computed answer equal to the identity substitution.
The following theorem generalizes a result of Hill [H74] (see also [Apt90][Theorem 3.15]):
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Theorem 7.37 Let P be a program and G =← A a goal. Suppose that P∪{G} is unsatisfiable.
Then, there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {G}.
Proof. Since P ∪ {G} is unsatisfiable and since MP is a model of P, we conclude that
[[G]]s(MP) = 0, for some state s. Therefore, [[A]]s(MP) = 1. By Lemma 7.15 we can con-
struct a substitution θ such that [[Aθ]]s′(MP) = 1 for all states s
′. By Theorem 7.36, there
exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {Gθ}. By Lemma 7.28 there exists an SLD-refutation for
P ∪ {G}.
Finally, the following theorem is a generalization of Clark’s theorem [Cla79] (see also the
more accessible [Apt90][Theorem 3.18]) for the higher-order case:
Theorem 7.38 (Completeness) Let P be a program and G =← A a goal. For every correct
answer θ for P∪ {G}, there exists an SLD-refutation for P∪ {G} with computed answer δ and
a substitution γ such that Gθ = Gδγ.
Proof. Since θ is a correct answer for P ∪ {← A}, it follows that [[Aθ]]s(MP) = 1 for all
Herbrand states s. By Theorem 7.36, P ∪ {Gθ} has an SLD-refutation with computed answer
equal to the identity substitution. This means that if σ is the composition of the substitutions
used in the refutation of P ∪ {Gθ}, then Gθσ = Gθ. By Lemma 7.28 there exists an SLD-
refutation for P ∪ {G} using substitution δ′ such that for some substitution γ, Gδ′γ = Gθσ.
Let δ be δ′ restricted to the variables in G. Then, it also holds that Gδ′γ = Gδγ, and therefore
Gδγ = Gθσ = Gθ.
8 Related Work
As already discussed in Section 1, research in higher-order logic programming can be catego-
rized in two main streams: the extensional approaches and the intensional ones.
Work on extensional higher-order logic programming is rather limited. Apart from the re-
sults of [Wad91]5, the only other work that has come to our attention is that of M. Bezem [Bez99,
Bez01], who considers higher-order logic programming languages with syntax similar to that
of [Wad91]. In [Bez01] a notion of extensionality is defined (called the extensional collapse)
and it is demonstrated that many logic programs are extensional under this notion; however,
this notion appears to differ from classical extensionality and has a more proof-theoretical
flavor.
On the other hand, work on intensional higher-order logic programming is much more
extended. The two main existing approaches in this area are represented by the languages
λProlog and HiLog. Both systems have mature implementations and have been tested in
various application domains. It should be noted that both λProlog and HiLog encourage a
form of higher-order programming that extends in various ways the higher-order programming
capabilities that are supported by functional programming languages. For a more detailed
discussion on this issue, see [NM98][section 7.4].
In the rest of this section, we give a very brief presentation of certain characteristics of these
two systems that are related to their intensional behavior (ie., characteristics that will help
the reader further clarify the differences between the intensional and extensional approaches).
A detailed discussion on the syntax, semantics, implementation and applications of the two
languages, is outside the scope of this paper (and the interested reader can consult the relevant
bibliography).
5The work in [Wad91] has also been used in order to define a higher-order extension of Datalog [KRW05].
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λProlog: The language was initially designed in the late 1980s [MN86, Nad87, NM90] in order
to provide a proof theoretic basis for logic programming. The syntax of λProlog is based on
the intuitionistic theory of higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas. The resulting language is
a powerful one, that allows the programmer to quantify over function and predicate variables,
to use λ-abstractions in terms, and so on. The semantics of λProlog is not extensional (see for
example the discussion in [NM98]). The following simple example illustrates this idea.
Example 8.1 Consider the λProlog program (we omit type declarations):
r p.
p X :- q X.
q X :- p X.
The goal ?-r q. fails for the above program.
In the following we briefly discuss the behavior of λProlog with respect to queries that contain
uninstantiated higher-order variables (because, from a user point of view, this is a key concept
that can differentiate an intensional system from an extensional one). Consider for example
the query:
?-(R john mary).
The above goal is not a meaningful one for λProlog because there exist too many suitable
answer substitutions (ie., predicate terms) for R that one could think of (see the relevant
discussion in [NM98][page 50]). One way to get answers to such queries is to use an extra
predicate, say rel, which specifies a collection of predicate terms that are relevant to consider
as substitutions. In this case, the above query will be written as:
?-(rel R),(R john mary).
and the implementation will return those terms for which the query succeeds. In other words,
an answer for the above query is a predicate term (such as for example married, father,
a lambda expression, and so on). As remarked in [CKW93], “equality in (a fragment of)
λProlog corresponds to λ-equivalence and is not extensional: there may exist predicates that
are not λ-equivalent but still extensionally equal”. This is a key difference from the extensional
approach presented in this paper, in which an answer to a query is a set.
HiLog: The language possesses a higher-order syntax and a first-order semantics [CKW89,
CKW93]. It extends classical logic programming quite naturally, and allows the programmer
to write in a concise way programs that would be rather awkward to code in Prolog. It
has been used in various application domains (eg. deductive and object-oriented databases,
modular logic programming, and so on).
As it is the case with λProlog, HiLog is also an intensional higher-order language. The
examples with uninstantiated higher-order variables mentioned for λProlog have a somewhat
similar behavior in HiLog. However, consider the program:
married(john,mary).
Then, the query:
?-R(john,mary).
is a meaningful one for HiLog, and the interpreter will respond with R = married. Intuitively,
the interpreter searches the program for possible candidate relations and tests them one by
one. Of course, if there is no binary relation defined in the program, the above query will fail.
The above program behavior can be best explained by the following comment from [CKW93]:
“in HiLog predicates and other higher-order syntactic objects are not equal unless they (ie.,
their names) are equated explicitly”.
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9 Implementation and Future Work
A prototype implementation of the proposed proof procedure has been performed in Haskell6.
A detailed description of the implementation is outside the scope of this paper. However, in
the following we outline certain points that we feel are important.
The main difference in comparison to a first-order implementation, is that the proof proce-
dure has to generate an infinite (yet enumerable) number of basic templates. In order to make
more efficient the production of the basic templates, one main optimization has been adopted.
As we have already mentioned in Definition 7.3, a basic template is a non-empty finite union
of basic expressions of a particularly simple form. In the implementation, the members of this
union are generated in a “demand-driven way”, as the following examples illustrate.
Example 9.1 Consider the query ← (R a b),(R c d). The proposed proof procedure would
try some basic templates until it finds one that satisfies the query. However, if it first tries
the basic template (λX.λY.(X≈Z)∧(Y≈W)) then this will obviously not lead to an answer
(since a relation that satisfies the above query must contain at least two pairs of elements).
In order to avoid such cases, our implementation initially produces a basic expression that
consists of the union of a basic template with an uninstantiated variable (say L) of the same
type as the template; intuitively, L represents a (yet undetermined) set of basic templates
that may be needed later during resolution and which need not yet be explicitly generated.
In our example, the implementation starts with the production of an expression of the form
(λX.λY.(X≈Z)∧(Y≈W))
∨
L. When the second application in the goal is reached, then a sec-
ond basic template will be generated together with a new uninstantiated variable (say L1).
The final answer to the query will be an expression of the form: (λX.λY.(X≈a)∧(Y≈b))
∨
(λX.λY.(X≈c)∧(Y≈d))
∨
L1. The intuitive meaning of the above answer is that the query
is satisfied by all relations that contain at least the pairs (a, b) and (c, d).
Notice that an important practical advantage of the above optimization is that a unique
answer to the given query is generated. Notice also that if the formal proof procedure of
the previous sections was followed faithfully in the implementation, then an infinite number of
answers would be generated: an answer representing the two-element relation {(a, b), (c, d)}, an
answer representing all three-element relations {(a, b), (c, d), (X1, X2)}, an answer representing
the four-element relations {(a, b), (c, d), (X1, X2), (X3, X4)}, and so on.
Example 9.2 Consider the ordered predicate of Example 3.7 and let← ordered R [1,2,3]
be a query. Following the same ideas as in the previous example, the implementation will
produce the unique answer (λX.λY.(X≈1)∧(Y≈2))
∨
(λX.λY.(X≈2)∧(Y≈3))
∨
L. Intu-
itively, this answer states that the list [1,2,3] is ordered under any relation of the form
{(1, 2), (2, 3)} ∪ L.
Finally, consider Example 3.6 defining the closure predicate. Consider also the query
← closure Q a b. Then, the implementation will enumerate the following (infinite set of)
answers:
Q = (λX.λY.(X≈a)∧(Y≈b))
∨
L
Q = (λX.λY.(X≈a)∧(Y≈Z))
∨
(λX.λY.(X≈Z)∧(Y≈b))
∨
L
. . .
which intuitively correspond to relations of the following forms:
Q = {(a, b)} ∪ L
Q = {(a, Z), (Z, b)} ∪ L
. . .
6The code can be retrieved from http://code.haskell.org/hopes
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Intuitively, the above answers state that the pair (a, b) belongs to the transitive closure of all
relations that contain at least the pair (a, b); moreover, it also belongs to the transitive closure
of all relations that contain at least two pairs of the form (a, Z) and (Z, b) for any Z, and so
on.
We are currently considering issues regarding an extended WAM-based implementation of
the ideas presented in the paper. We believe that ideas originating from graph-reduction [FH88]
will also prove vital in the development of this extended implementation.
Another interesting direction for future research is the extension of our higher-order frag-
ment with negation-as-failure. The semantics of negation in a higher-order setting could
probably be captured model-theoretically using the recent purely logical characterization of
the well-founded semantics through an appropriate infinite-valued logic [RW05].
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Costas Koutras for valuable discussions regard-
ing algebraic lattices and the reading group on programming languages at the University of
Athens for many insightful comments and suggestions.
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A Proof of Lemma 4.17
In order to establish Lemma 4.17, we first demonstrate the following auxiliary propositions:
Proposition A.1 Let A be a poset and L be an algebraic lattice. Then, for each step function
(aց c) and for every f : [A
m
→ L] it holds that (aց c) ⊑ f if and only if c ⊑ f(a).
Proof. If (a ց c) ⊑ f , by applying both functions to a we get c ⊑ f(a). Now suppose that
c ⊑ f(a) and consider an arbitrary x ∈ A. In case a ⊑ x, we have (a ց c)(x) = c thus,
since c ⊑ f(a) and f is monotonic, (a ց c)(x) ⊑ f(x). Otherwise, (a ց c)(x) =⊥L thus
(aց c)(x) ⊑ f(x). It follows that (aց c) ⊑ f .
Proposition A.2 Let L be a complete lattice and assume there exists B ⊆ K(L) such that for
every x ∈ L, x =
⊔
B[x]. Then L is an algebraic lattice (ω-algebraic if B is countable) with
basis K(L) = {
⊔
M |M is a finite subset of B}.
Proof. It is immediate that L is algebraic, since by assumption every element of L can be
written as the least upper bound of a set of compact elements of L. The nontrivial part is
establishing the relation between K(L) and B.
Given x ∈ L, we let ∆(x) be the set {
⊔
M | M is a finite subset of B[x]}. Notice that
B[x] =
⋃
{M | M is a finite subset of B[x]}. Using Proposition 4.3(2), we have that
⊔
B[x] =
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⊔
∆(x) and thus
⊔
∆(x) = x. We show that for each x ∈ L it holds that K(L)[x] = ∆(x) by
proving that each set is a subset of the other one.
First consider an arbitrary c ∈ K(L)[x] and recall that c =
⊔
∆(c). By the compactness
of c, there exists a finite A ⊆ ∆(c) such that c ⊑
⊔
A. But then
⊔
A ⊑ c because c is
an upper bound of ∆(c), and therefore c =
⊔
A. By the definition of ∆(c) and the fact
that A ⊆ ∆(c), we get that c =
⊔
{
⊔
M1, . . . ,
⊔
Mr}, where M1, . . . ,Mr are finite subsets of
B[c]. By Proposition 4.3(2), c =
⊔
(M1 ∪ · · · ∪Mr). In other words there exists a finite set
M = M1 ∪ · · · ∪Mr such that M ⊆ B[c] ⊆ B[x] and c =
⊔
M , which means that c ∈ ∆(x).
On the other hand, consider a finite set M = {c1, . . . , cn} ⊆ B[x] such that
⊔
M ∈ ∆(x).
Let A be a subset of L such that
⊔
M ⊑
⊔
A. Due to the compactness of each ci, by
ci ⊑
⊔
A we get ci ⊑
⊔
Ai for some finite Ai ⊆ A. But then, for every i, ci ⊑
⊔
Ai ⊑⊔
{
⊔
A1, . . . ,
⊔
An} =
⊔
(A1 ∪ · · · ∪ An). In other words,
⊔
M ⊑
⊔
(A1 ∪ · · · ∪ An), which
implies that
⊔
M is compact. Moreover, since x is an upper bound of M , we have that⊔
M ∈ K(L)[x]. Hence, K(L)[x] = ∆(x).
To complete the proof, simply take x =
⊔
L in the equality K(L)[x] = ∆(x). If, additionally,
B is countable, the cardinality of K(L) is bounded by the number of finite subsets of a countable
set, which is countable. Hence, L is an ω-algebraic lattice in this case.
We can now proceed to the proof of Lemma 4.17:
Lemma 4.17 Let A be a poset and L be an algebraic lattice. Then, [A
m
→ L] is an algebraic
lattice whose basis is the set of all least upper bounds of finitely many step functions from
A to L. If, additionally, A is countable and L is an ω-algebraic lattice then [A
m
→ L] is an
ω-algebraic lattice.
Proof. Let B denote the set of all step functions from A to L. Recall that [A
m
→ L] forms
a complete lattice by Proposition 4.10. Let (a ց c) ∈ B be an arbitrary step function. We
show that (aց c) is compact. Consider a set F of monotonic functions from A to L such that
(aց c) ⊑
⊔
F . By Propositions A.1 and 4.10 we get that c ⊑
⊔
f∈F f(a). By the compactness
of c, there exists a finite F ′ ⊆ F such that c ⊑
⊔
f∈F ′ f(a). Let f
′ =
⊔
F ′. Then, c ⊑ f ′(a), or
equivalently by Proposition A.1, (aց c) ⊑ f ′ =
⊔
F ′. Hence, (aց c) is compact.
We now show that every monotonic function f ∈ [A
m
→ L] is the least upper bound of B[f ].
Since f is an upper bound of this set, we let g be an upper bound of B[f ] and prove that f ⊑ g.
In fact, we consider an arbitrary x ∈ A and prove that f(x) ⊑ g(x). Suppose Sx is the set of
all step functions hc = (xց c) for every compact element c ∈ K(L)[f(x)]. By Proposition A.1,
we have that for all step functions hc ∈ Sx, are hc ⊑ f ; thus Sx is a subset of B[f ]. Since g is
an upper bound of B[f ], it must also be an upper bound of Sx, therefore it holds that hc ⊑ g
for each hc ∈ Sx. Applying this inequality for x we get that c ⊑ g(x) for each c ∈ K(L)[f(x)],
therefore
⊔
K(L)[f(x)] ⊑ g(x). Since L is an algebraic lattice, f(x) is the least upper bound of
K(L)[f(x)], thus f(x) ⊑ g(x). Hence, f is the least upper bound of B[f ].
On the whole, we have shown that B is a subset of K([A
m
→ L]) such that each monotonic
function f from A to L is the least upper bound of B[f ]. Notice that if, additionally, A is
countable and L is an ω-algebraic lattice, then B is countable because its cardinality is equal
to that of the cartesian product of two countable sets. Now apply Proposition A.2.
B Proof of Lemma 5.10
Lemma 5.10 Let E : ρ be an expression of H and let D be a nonempty set. Moreover, let
s, s1, s2 be states over D and let I be an interpretation over D. Then:
35
1. [[E]]s(I) ∈ [[ρ]]D.
2. If E is positive and s1 ⊑SH,D s2 then [[E]]s1(I) ⊑ρ [[E]]s2(I).
Proof. The two statements are established simultaneously by a structural induction on E.
Induction Basis: The cases for E being 0, 1, c, p or V, are all straightforward.
Induction Step: The interesting cases are E = (E1E2) and E = (λV.E1). The other cases are
easier and omitted.
Case 1: E = (E1E2). We examine the two statements of the lemma:
Statement 1: Assume that E1 : ρ1 → π2 and E2 : ρ1. Then, it suffices to demonstrate
that [[(E1E2)]]s(I) ∈ [[π2]]D, or equivalently that
⊔
b∈B([[E1]]s(I)(b)) ∈ [[π2]]D, where B =
FD(type(E2))[[[E2]]s(I)]
= {b ∈ FD(type(E2)) | b ⊑ [[E2]]s(I)}. By the induction hypothesis,
[[E1]]s(I) ∈ [[ρ1 → π2]]D and [[E2]]s(I) ∈ [[ρ1]]D. But then, for every b ∈ B, [[E1]]s(I)(b) ∈ [[π2]]D
and since [[π2]]D is a complete lattice, we get that
⊔
b∈B([[E1]]s(I)(b)) ∈ [[π2]]D.
Statement 2: It suffices to demonstrate that [[(E1E2)]]s1(I) ⊑ [[(E1E2)]]s2(I), or equivalently
that
⊔
b2∈B2
([[E1]]s1(I)(b2)) ⊑
⊔
b′
2
∈B′
2
([[E1]]s2(I)(b
′
2)), where B2 = FD(type(E2))[[[E2]]s1 (I)]
and
B′2 = FD(type(E2))[[[E2]]s2 (I)]
. Notice that by definition, B2 = {b ∈ FD(type(E2)) | b ⊑
[[E2]]s1(I)} and B
′
2 = {b ∈ FD(type(E2)) | b ⊑ [[E2]]s2(I)}. By the induction hypothesis we have
[[E2]]s1(I) ⊑ [[E2]]s2(I), and therefore B2 ⊆ B
′
2. By the induction hypothesis we also have that
[[E1]]s1(I) ⊑ [[E1]]s2(I). By the induction hypothesis for the first statement of the lemma, both
[[E1]]s1(I) and [[E1]]s2(I) are monotonic functions since they belong to [[ρ1 → π2]]D. Therefore,⊔
b2∈B2
([[E1]]s1(I)(b2)) ⊑
⊔
b′
2
∈B′
2
([[E1]]s2(I)(b
′
2)), or equivalently [[(E1E2)]]s1(I) ⊑ [[(E1E2)]]s2(I).
Case 2: E = (λV.E1). We examine the two statements of the lemma:
Statement 1: Assume that V : ρ1 and E1 : π1. We show that [[(λV.E1)]]s(I) ∈ [[ρ1 → π1]]D.
We distinguish two cases, namely ρ1 = ι and ρ1 = π. If ρ1 = ι then the result follows easily
using the induction hypothesis for the first statement of the lemma. If ρ1 = π, then we must
demonstrate that [[(λV.E1)]]s(I) ∈ [[π → π1]]D = [K([[π]]D)
m
→ [[π1]]D]. In other words, we need
to show that the function λd.[[E1]]s[d/V](I) is monotonic. But this follows directly from the
induction hypothesis for the second statement of the lemma.
Statement 2: It suffices to show that [[(λV.E1)]]s1(I) ⊑ [[(λV.E1)]]s2(I). By the semantics of
lambda abstraction, it suffices to show that λd.[[E1]]s1[d/V](I) ⊑ λd.[[E1]]s2[d/V](I), or that for
every d, [[E1]]s1[d/V](I) ⊑ [[E1]]s2[d/V](I), which holds by the induction hypothesis.
C Proof of Lemma 6.5
Lemma 6.5 Let P be a program and let E : ρ be a positive expression of P. Let I, J be
Herbrand interpretations and s a Herbrand state of P . If I ⊑IP J then [[E]]s(I) ⊑ρ [[E]]s(J).
Proof. The proof is by a structural induction on E.
Induction Basis: The cases for E being 0, 1, c, p or V, are all straightforward.
Induction Step: The interesting cases are E = (E1E2) and E = (λV.E1). The other cases are
easier and omitted.
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Case 1: E = (E1E2). It suffices to demonstrate that [[(E1E2)]]s(I) ⊑ [[(E1E2)]]s(J), or equiv-
alently that
⊔
b2∈B2
([[E1]]s(I)(b2)) ⊑
⊔
b′
2
∈B′
2
([[E1]]s(J)(b
′
2)), where B2 = FD(type(E2))[[[E2]]s(I)]
and B′2 = FD(type(E2))[[[E2]]s(J)]
. Notice that by definition, B2 = {b ∈ FD(type(E2)) | b ⊑
[[E2]]s(I)} and B
′
2 = {b ∈ FD(type(E2)) | b ⊑ [[E2]]s(J)}. By the induction hypothesis we have
[[E2]]s(I) ⊑ [[E2]]s(J), and therefore B2 ⊆ B
′
2. By the induction hypothesis we also have that
[[E1]]s(I) ⊑ [[E1]]s(J). Therefore,
⊔
b2∈B2
([[E1]]s(I)(b2)) ⊑
⊔
b′
2
∈B′
2
([[E1]]s(J)(b
′
2)), or equivalently
[[(E1E2)]]s(I) ⊑ [[(E1E2)]]s(J).
Case 2: E = (λV.E1). It suffices to show that [[(λV.E1)]]s(I) ⊑ [[(λV.E1)]]s(J). By the semantics
of lambda abstraction, it suffices to show that λd.[[E1]]s[d/V](I) ⊑ λd.[[E1]]s[d/V](J), or that for
every d, [[E1]]s[d/V](I) ⊑ [[E1]]s[d/V](J), which holds by the induction hypothesis.
D Proof of Lemma 6.6
Lemma 6.6 Let P be a program and let E be any positive expression of P. Let I be a
directed set of Herbrand interpretations and s be a Herbrand state of P. Then, [[E]]s(
⊔
I) =⊔
I∈I [[E]]s(I).
Proof. The proof can be performed in two steps: we first show that [[E]]s(
⊔
I) ⊒
⊔
I∈I [[E]]s(I)
and then that [[E]]s(
⊔
I) ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[E]]s(I).
For the first of these two statements observe that by Lemma 6.5, we have that [[E]]s(
⊔
I) ⊒
[[E]]s(I), for all I ∈ I. But then [[E]]s(
⊔
I) is an upper bound of the set {[[E]]s(I) | I ∈ I}, and
therefore [[E]]s(
⊔
I) ⊒
⊔
I∈I [[E]]s(I). It remains to show that [[E]]s(
⊔
I) ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[E]]s(I). The
proof is by a structural induction on E.
Induction Basis: The cases for E being 0, 1, c, p or V, are all straightforward.
Induction Hypothesis: Assume that for given expressions E1,E2 it holds that [[Ei]]s(
⊔
I) =⊔
I∈I [[Ei]]s(I), i ∈ {1, 2}. Notice that we assume equality. This is due to the fact that the one
direction has already been established for all expressions while the other direction is assumed.
Induction Step: We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: E = f E1 · · · En. This case is straightforward since for every interpretation I and for
every state s, the value of [[f E1 · · ·En]]s(I) only depends on s (since the expressions E1, . . . ,En
are of type ι and do not contain predicate symbols).
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Case 2: E = (E1E2). Assume that E2 : ρ. Then:
[[(E1E2)]]s(
⊔
I) =
=
⊔
b∈B([[E1]]s(
⊔
I)(b)), where B = {b ∈ FD(ρ) | b ⊑ [[E2]]s(
⊔
I)}
(Semantics of application)
=
⊔
b∈B((
⊔
I∈I [[E1]]s(I))(b)), where B = {b ∈ FD(ρ) | b ⊑ [[E2]]s(
⊔
I)}
(Induction hypothesis)
=
⊔
b∈B(
⊔
I∈I [[E1]]s(I)(b)), where B = {b ∈ FD(ρ) | b ⊑ [[E2]]s(
⊔
I)}
(Proposition 4.10)
=
⊔
{[[E1]]s(I)(b) | I ∈ I, b ∈ FD(ρ), b ⊑ [[E2]]s(
⊔
I)}
(Proposition 4.3(2))
=
⊔
{[[E1]]s(I)(b) | I ∈ I, b ∈ FD(ρ), b ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[E2]]s(I)}
(Induction hypothesis)
=
⊔
{[[E1]]s(I)(b) | I ∈ I, b ∈ FD(ρ), b ⊑
⊔
J∈F [[E2]]s(J), F finite subset of I}
(Since b is either a compact element or a member of D)
⊑
⊔
{[[E1]]s(I)(b) | I ∈ I, b ∈ FD(ρ), b ⊑ [[E2]]s(J)}, for some J ∈ I
(Because I is directed and [[E2]]s is monotonic by Lemma 6.5)
⊑
⊔
{[[E1]]s(I)(b) | I ∈ I, J ∈ I, b ∈ FD(ρ), b ⊑ [[E2]]s(J)}
(Proposition 4.3(1))
⊑
⊔
I∈I,J∈I
⊔
{[[E1]]s(I)(b) | b ∈ FD(ρ), b ⊑ [[E2]]s(J)}
(Proposition 4.3(2))
⊑
⊔
I∈I
⊔
{[[E1]]s(I)(b) | b ∈ FD(ρ), b ⊑ [[E2]]s(I)}
(Proposition 4.7)
=
⊔
I∈I [[(E1E2)]]s(I)
(Semantics of application)
Case 3: E = (λV.E1). We show that [[(λV.E1)]]s(
⊔
I) ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[(λV.E1)]]s(I). Consider b ∈
FD(type(V)). By the semantics of lambda abstraction we get that [[(λV.E1)]]s(
⊔
I)(b) =
[[E1]]s[b/V](
⊔
I); by the induction hypothesis this is equal to
⊔
I∈I [[E1]]s[b/V](I), which by Propo-
sition 4.10 is equal to (
⊔
I∈I [[(λV.E1)]]s(I))(b).
Case 4: E = (E1
∨
π E2). We show that [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(
⊔
I) ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(I), ie., that
for all b1, . . . , bn, if [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn = 1 then (
⊔
I∈I [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(I)) b1 · · · bn = 1.
By the semantics of
∨
π we get that if [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn = 1 then [[E1]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn =
1 or [[E2]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn = 1. By the induction hypothesis and Proposition 4.10 we get that
either
⊔
I∈I([[E1]]s(I) b1 · · · bn) = 1 or
⊔
I∈I([[E2]]s(I) b1 · · · bn) = 1. Then there must exist I ∈ I
such that either [[E1]]s(I) b1 · · · bn = 1 or [[E2]]s(I) b1 · · · bn = 1. By the semantics of
∨
π we get
that [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(I) b1 · · · bn = 1 and therefore (
⊔
I∈I [[(E1
∨
π E2)]]s(I)) b1 · · · bn = 1.
Case 5: E = (E1
∧
π E2). We show that [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(
⊔
I) ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(I). In
other words, it suffices to show that for all b1, . . . , bn, if [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn = 1
then (
⊔
I∈I [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(I)) b1 · · · bn = 1. But if [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn = 1, then by
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the semantics of
∧
π we get that [[E1]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn = 1 and [[E2]]s(
⊔
I) b1 · · · bn = 1. By
the induction hypothesis and Proposition 4.10 this implies that
⊔
I∈I([[E1]]s(I) b1 · · · bn) = 1
and
⊔
I∈I([[E2]]s(I) b1 · · · bn) = 1. This means that there must exist I1, I2 ∈ I such that
[[E1]]s(I1) b1 · · · bn = 1 and [[E2]]s(I2) b1 · · · bn = 1. Since I is directed, we get that I =
⊔
{I1, I2}
exists in I and it holds that [[E1]]s(I) b1 · · · bn = 1 and [[E2]]s(I) b1 · · · bn = 1. By the semantics
of
∧
π, [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(I) b1 · · · bn = 1 and therefore (
⊔
I∈I [[(E1
∧
π E2)]]s(I)) b1 · · · bn = 1.
Case 6: E = (E1 ≈ E2). It suffices to show that [[(E1 ≈ E2)]]s(
⊔
I) ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[(E1 ≈ E2)]]s(I).
This is straightforward since the value of [[(E1 ≈ E2)]] only depends on s (since the expressions
E1,E2 do not contain predicate symbols).
Case 7: E = (∃VE1). We show that [[(∃E1)]]s(
⊔
I) ⊑
⊔
I∈I [[(∃VE1)]]s(I) or equivalently that
if [[(∃VE1)]]s(
⊔
I) = 1 then
⊔
I∈I [[(∃VE1)]]s(I) = 1. Notice now that if [[(∃VE1)]]s(
⊔
I) = 1
then there exists b such that [[E1]]s[b/V](
⊔
I) = 1, which by the induction hypothesis gives⊔
I∈I [[E1]]s[b/V](I) = 1. But this last statement implies that
⊔
I∈I [[(∃VE1)]]s(I) = 1.
E Proof of Lemma 7.27
Lemma 7.27 Let P be a program, G a goal and θ a substitution. Suppose that there exists
an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ} using substitution σ. Then, there exists an SLD-refutation
of P ∪ {G} using a substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds that δγ ⊇ θσ and
dom(δγ − θσ) is a (possibly empty) set of template variables that are introduced during the
refutation of P ∪ {G}.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length n of the SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Gθ}.
Induction Basis: The basis case is for n = 1. We need to distinguish cases based on the
structure of G. The most interesting case is G = (E1 ≈ E2) (the rest are simpler and omitted).
By assumption, it holds that (E1θ ≈ E2θ)
σ
→ ✷, where σ is an mgu of E1θ and E2θ. But then
we also have that (E1 ≈ E2)
δ
→ ✷, where δ is an mgu of E1 and E2. Since θσ is a unifier of
E1,E2, there exists substitution γ such that θσ = δγ.
Induction Step: We demonstrate the statement for SLD-refutations of length n + 1. We dis-
tinguish cases based on the structure of G.
Case 1: G =← (pE1 · · ·Ek). Then, Gθ =← (p (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)). By Definition 7.18 we get
that p (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)
ǫ
→ E (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ), where p ← E is a rule in P. By assumption,
E (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ) has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ. Consider now the goal G. By Defi-
nition 7.18, we get that (pE1 · · · Ek)
ǫ
→ (EE1 · · ·Ek). Notice now that since E is a closed lambda
expression, it holds that (EE1 · · · Ek)θ = (E (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)). Moreover, since (E (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ))
has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that (EE1 · · ·Ek)
has an SLD-refutation using substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds that δγ ⊇ θσ
and dom(δγ − θσ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during the refutation of
(EE1 · · · Ek). But then, (pE1 · · · Ek) has an SLD-refutation which satisfies the requirements of
the lemma.
Case 2: G =← (QE1 · · ·Ek). Consider first the case where θ(Q) = B, for some basic expression
B. Then, Gθ =← (B (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)). Notice now that B can be either a higher-order predicate
variable or a finite-union of lambda abstractions. We examine the case where B is a single
lambda abstraction (the other two cases are similar). Since B is a lambda abstraction, assume
that B = λV.C. By Definition 7.18 we get that B (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)
ǫ
→ C{V/(E1θ)} (E2θ) · · · (Ekθ).
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By assumption, C{V/(E1θ)} (E2θ) · · · (Ekθ) has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ. Consider
now the goal G. By Definition 7.18, we get that (QE1 · · ·Ek)
{Q/Bt}
→ Bt (E1{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt}),
where Bt = λV.Ct, and B = Btγ1, for some substitution γ1 with dom(γ1) = FV (Bt). We
assume without loss of generality that the set dom(γ1) is disjoint from FV (G) and from
dom(θ) ∪ FV (range(θ)). By Definition 7.18 we get that Bt (E1{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt})
ǫ
→
Ct{V/E1{Q/Bt}} (E2{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt}). Notice now that:
((Ct{V/E1{Q/Bt}}) (E2{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt}))θγ1 = (C{V/E1θ}) (E2θ) · · · (Ekθ)
Then, since (C{V/E1θ}) (E2θ) · · · (Ekθ) has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ, we get
by the induction hypothesis that (Ct{V/E1{Q/Bt}}) (E2{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt}) has an SLD-
refutation using substitution δ′, where for some substitution γ it holds δ′γ ⊇ θγ1σ and
dom(δ′γ− θγ1σ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during this SLD-refutation.
From the above discussion we conclude that (QE1 · · · Ek) has an SLD-refutation using sub-
stitution δ = {Q/Bt}δ
′. Moreover, it holds that δγ = {Q/Bt}δ
′γ ⊇ {Q/Bt}θγ1σ ⊇ θσ and
dom(δγ − θσ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during the refutation of
(QE1 · · ·Ek).
Consider now the case where θ(Q) is undefined. Then, Gθ =← (Q (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)). By
Definition 7.18 we get that Q (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)
{Q/Bt}
→ Bt (E1θ{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ekθ{Q/Bt}). We may
assume without loss of generality that the set FV (Bt) is disjoint from FV (G) and from dom(θ)∪
FV (range(θ)). By assumption, Bt (E1θ{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ekθ{Q/Bt}) has an SLD-refutation of
length n using σ′, where σ = {Q/Bt}σ
′. Consider now the goal G. By Definition 7.18, we
get that (QE1 · · · Ek)
{Q/Bt}
→ Bt (E1{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt}). Notice now that:
(Bt (E1{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt}))θ{Q/Bt} = Bt (E1θ{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ekθ{Q/Bt})
Then, since Bt (E1θ{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ekθ{Q/Bt}) has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ
′, we
get by the induction hypothesis that Bt (E1{Q/Bt}) · · · (Ek{Q/Bt}) has an SLD-refutation us-
ing substitution δ′, where for some substitution γ it holds δ′γ ⊇ θ{Q/Bt}σ
′ and dom(δ′γ −
θ{Q/Bt}σ
′) is a set of template variables that are introduced during this SLD-refutation; notice
that these template variables can be chosen to be different than the variables in FV (Bt). From
the above discussion we conclude that (QE1 · · ·Ek) has an SLD-refutation using substitution
δ = {Q/Bt}δ
′. Moreover, it holds that δγ = {Q/Bt}δ
′γ ⊇ {Q/Bt}θ{Q/Bt}σ
′ = θ{Q/Bt}σ
′ =
θσ and dom(δγ − θσ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during the refutation
of (QE1 · · ·Ek).
Case 3: G =← ((λV.E)E1 · · ·Ek). Then, Gθ =← ((λV.Eθ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)). By Definition 7.18
we get that (λV.Eθ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)
ǫ
→ (Eθ{V/(E1θ)}) (E2θ) · · · (Ekθ). Moreover, by assumption,
(Eθ{V/(E1θ)}) (E2θ) · · · (Ekθ) has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ. Consider now the goal
G. By Definition 7.18, we get that (λV.E)E1 · · ·Ek
ǫ
→ (E{V/E1})E2 · · ·Ek. Notice now that
((E{V/E1})E2 · · ·Ek)θ = (Eθ{V/(E1θ)}) (E2θ) · · · (Ekθ), and since the latter expression has an
SLD-refutation of length n using σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that (E{V/E1})E2 · · ·Ek
has an SLD-refutation using a substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds δγ ⊇ θσ
and dom(δγ − θσ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during this refutation.
But then, ((λV.E)E1 · · ·Ek) has an SLD-refutation using substitution δ which satisfies the
requirements of the lemma.
Case 4: G =← ((E′
∨
π E
′′)E1 · · · Ek). Then, Gθ =← ((E
′θ
∨
π E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)). By Defini-
tion 7.18 we get that (E′θ
∨
π E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)
ǫ
→ (E′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ) (and symmetrically for
E′′). By assumption, either (E′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ) or (E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ) has an SLD-refutation
of length n using σ. Assume, without loss of generality, that (E′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ) has an SLD-
refutation of length n using σ. Consider now the goal G. By Definition 7.18, we get that
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(E′
∨
π E
′′)E1 · · ·Ek
ǫ
→ E′ E1 · · · Ek. Notice now that (E
′ E1 · · ·Ek)θ = (E
′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ), and
since the latter expression has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ, we get by the induction
hypothesis that E′ E1 · · ·Ek has an SLD-refutation using a substitution δ, where for some sub-
stitution γ it holds δγ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ−θσ) is a set of template variables that are introduced
during this refutation. But then, (E′
∨
π E
′′)E1 · · · Ek has an SLD-refutation using substitution
δ which satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Case 5: G =← ((E′
∧
π E
′′)E1 · · · Ek). Then, Gθ =← ((E
′θ
∧
π E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)). By Defini-
tion 7.18 we get (E′θ
∨
π E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)
ǫ
→ ((E′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)) ∧ ((E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)).
By assumption, ((E′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ))∧ ((E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)) has an SLD-refutation of length
n using σ. Consider now the goal G. By Definition 7.18, we get that (E′
∧
π E
′′)E1 · · ·Ek
ǫ
→
(E′ E1 · · ·Ek) ∧ (E
′′ E1 · · · Ek). Notice now that it holds that ((E
′ E1 · · ·Ek) ∧ (E
′′ E1 · · · Ek))θ =
((E′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ))∧((E
′′θ) (E1θ) · · · (Ekθ)); since the latter expression has an SLD-refutation
of length n using σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that (E′ E1 · · ·Ek) ∧ (E
′′ E1 · · ·Ek) has
an SLD-refutation using a substitution δ, where for some substitution γ it holds δγ ⊇ θσ
and dom(δγ − θσ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during this refutation.
But then, (E′
∧
π E
′′)E1 · · · Ek has an SLD-refutation using substitution δ which satisfies the
requirements of the lemma.
Case 6: G =← (✷∧ E). Then, Gθ =← (✷∧ (Eθ)). By Definition 7.18 we get (✷∧ (Eθ))
ǫ
→ Eθ.
By assumption, Eθ has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ. Consider now the goal G. By
Definition 7.18, we get that (✷ ∧ E)
ǫ
→ E. Since Eθ has an SLD-refutation of length n using
σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that E has an SLD-refutation using a substitution δ,
where for some substitution γ it holds δγ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ−θσ) is a set of template variables
that are introduced during this refutation. But then, (✷ ∧ E) has an SLD-refutation using
substitution δ which satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Case 7: G =← (E ∧ ✷). Almost identical to the previous case.
Case 8: G =← (∃VE). Then, Gθ =← (∃V (Eθ)). By Definition 7.18 we get (∃V (Eθ))
ǫ
→ Eθ.
By assumption, Eθ has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ. Consider now the goal G. By
Definition 7.18, we get that (∃VE)
ǫ
→ E. Since Eθ has an SLD-refutation of length n using
σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that E has an SLD-refutation using a substitution δ,
where for some substitution γ it holds δγ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ−θσ) is a set of template variables
that are introduced during this refutation. But then, (∃VE) has an SLD-refutation using
substitution δ which satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
Case 9: G =← (E1 ∧ E2). We may assume without loss of generality that given the goal
Gθ =← (E1θ ∧ E2θ), the first step in the refutation will take place due to the subexpression
E1θ. Moreover, again without loss of generality, due to the associativity of ∧, we assume that
E1 is not an expression that contains a top-level ∧ (ie., it is not of the form A1∧A2). The proof
could be easily adapted to circumvent the two assumptions just mentioned (but this would
result in more cumbersome notation). We perform a case analysis on E1:
Subcase 9.1: E1 = (A1 ≈ A2). Then, we have ((A1 ≈ A2)θ ∧ E2θ)
σ1→ (✷ ∧ E2θσ1), where σ1 is
an mgu of A1θ and A2θ. By assumption, (✷∧ E2θσ1) has an SLD-refutation of length n using
σ′, where σ = σ1σ
′. Consider now (E1 ∧ E2). By Definition 7.18, it holds that (A1 ≈ A2)
δ1→ ✷,
where δ1 is an mgu of A1,A2. By Definition 7.18 we get that ((A1 ≈ A2) ∧ E2)
δ1→ (✷ ∧ E2δ1).
Since θσ1 is a unifier of A1,A2, there exists θ
′ such that θσ1 = δ1θ
′, and since (✷ ∧ E2θσ1)
has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ′, we get that (✷ ∧ E2δ1θ
′) = (✷ ∧ E2δ1)θ
′ has an
SLD-refutation of length n using σ′. By the induction hypothesis we get that (✷∧E2δ1) has an
SLD-refutation using δ′, where δ′γ ⊇ θ′σ′ and dom(δ′γ−θ′σ′) is a set of template variables that
are introduced during the refutation of this goal. But then, (E1 ∧ E2) has an SLD-refutation
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using substitution δ = δ1δ
′. Moreover, it holds that δγ = δ1δ
′γ ⊇ δ1θ
′σ′ = θσ1σ
′ = θσ.
Subcase 9.2: E1 = (QA1 · · ·Ar). Consider first the case where θ(Q) = B, for some basic
expression B. Notice now that B can be either a higher-order predicate variable or a finite-
union of lambda abstractions. We examine the case where B is a single lambda abstraction (the
other two cases are similar). Since B is a lambda abstraction, we have that E1θ
ǫ
→ E′1, where E
′
1
is the resulting expression after performing the outer beta reduction in E1θ. By Definition 7.18
we have that (E1 ∧ E2)θ
ǫ
→ E′1 ∧ E2θ. By assumption, E
′
1 ∧ E2θ has an SLD-refutation of
length n using σ. Consider now (E1 ∧ E2). By Definition 7.18, it holds that E1
{Q/Bt}
→ E′′1 ,
where E′′1 = E1{Q/Bt} and B = Btγ1, for some substitution γ1, with dom(γ1) = FV (Bt).
We may assume without loss of generality that the set dom(γ1) is disjoint from FV (G) and
from dom(θ) ∪ FV (range(θ)). By Definition 7.18, we also get that E′′1
ǫ
→ E′′′1 , where E
′′′
1
is the expression that results after performing the outer beta reduction in E′′1 . Then, by
Definition 7.18 we get that E1∧E2
{Q/Bt}
→ E′′1 ∧E2{Q/Bt} and E
′′
1 ∧E2{Q/Bt}
ǫ
→ E′′′1 ∧E2{Q/Bt}.
Notice now that (E′′′1 ∧ E2{Q/Bt})θγ1 = E
′
1 ∧ E2θ, and since E
′
1 ∧ E2θ has an SLD-refutation
of length n using σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that (E′′′1 ∧ E2{Q/Bt}) has an SLD-
refutation using δ′, where for some substitution γ it holds δ′γ ⊇ θγ1σ and dom(δ
′γ − θγ1σ)
is a set of template variables that are introduced during this SLD-refutation. But then,
E1 ∧ E2 has an SLD-refutation using substitution δ = {Q/Bt}δ
′. Moreover, it holds that
δγ = {Q/Bt}δ
′γ ⊇ {Q/Bt}θγ1σ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ − θσ) is a set of template variables that are
introduced during the refutation of G.
Consider now the case where θ(Q) is undefined, ie., there does not exist a binding for Q
in θ. Then, we have that E1θ
{Q/Bt}
→ E′1, where E
′
1 = Bt (A1θ{Q/Bt}) · · · (Arθ{Q/Bt}). We
may assume without loss of generality that the set FV (Bt) is disjoint from FV (G) and from
dom(θ)∪FV (range(θ)). By Definition 7.18 we have that (E1 ∧ E2)θ
{Q/Bt}
→ E′1 ∧ (E2θ{Q/Bt}).
By assumption, E′1 ∧ (E2θ{Q/Bt}) has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ
′, where σ =
{Q/Bt}σ
′. Consider now (E1 ∧ E2). By Definition 7.18, it holds that E1
{Q/Bt}
→ E′′1, where
E′′1 = E1{Q/Bt}. By Definition 7.18 we get that E1 ∧ E2
{Q/Bt}
→ E′′1 ∧ E2{Q/Bt}. Notice now
that (E′′1 ∧ E2{Q/Bt})θ{Q/Bt} = E
′
1 ∧ E2θ{Q/Bt}, and since E
′
1 ∧ E2θ{Q/Bt} has an SLD-
refutation of length n using σ′, we get by the induction hypothesis that (E′′1 ∧ E2{Q/Bt}) has
an SLD-refutation using δ′, where for some substitution γ it holds that δ′γ ⊇ θ{Q/Bt}σ
′,
and dom(δ′γ − θ{Q/Bt}σ
′) is a set of template variables that are introduced during this SLD-
refutation; notice that these template variables can be chosen to be different than the variables
in FV (Bt). Then, E1 ∧ E2 has an SLD-refutation using substitution δ = {Q/Bt}δ
′. Moreover,
it holds that δγ = {Q/Bt}δ
′γ ⊇ {Q/Bt}θ{Q/Bt}σ
′ = θ{Q/Bt}σ
′ = θσ and dom(δγ − θσ) is a
set of template variables that are introduced during the refutation of G.
Subcase 9.3: E1 =← ((A
′
∨
π A
′′)A1 · · ·Ar). Then, E1θ = (A
′θ
∨
π A
′′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ). By
Definition 7.18 we get that (A′θ
∨
π A
′′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ)
ǫ
→ (A′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ) (and symmet-
rically for A′′). By Definition 7.18 we have (E1θ ∧ E2θ)
ǫ
→ ((A′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ)) ∧ E2θ and
(E1θ∧E2θ)
ǫ
→ ((A′′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ))∧E2θ. By assumption, either ((A
′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ))∧E2θ
or ((A′′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ)) ∧ E2θ has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ. Assume, without
loss of generality, that ((A′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ))∧ E2θ has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ.
Notice now that by Definition 7.18, we have that (A′
∨
π A
′′)A1 · · ·Ar
ǫ
→ A′ A1 · · ·Ar. More-
over, notice that ((A′ A1 · · ·Ar) ∧ E2)θ = ((A
′θ) (A1θ) · · · (Arθ)) ∧ E2θ, and since the latter
expression has an SLD-refutation of length n using σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that
((A′ A1 · · ·Ar)∧ E2) has an SLD-refutation using a substitution δ, where for some substitution
γ it holds δγ ⊇ θσ and dom(δγ − θσ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during
this refutation. But then, ((A′
∨
π A
′′)A1 · · ·Ar)∧E2 has an SLD-refutation using substitution
δ which satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
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Subcase 9.4: E1 has any other form except for the ones examined in the previous three subcases.
Then, it can be verified that in all these subcases it holds that E1θ
ǫ
→ E′1, for some E
′
1. By
Definition 7.18 we have that (E1 ∧ E2)θ
ǫ
→ E′1 ∧ (E2θ). By assumption, E
′
1 ∧ (E2θ) has an SLD-
refutation of length n using σ. Consider now (E1∧E2). By Definition 7.18 and by examination
of all the possible cases for E1 it can be seen that E1
ǫ
→ E′′1, where E
′
1 = E
′′
1θ. By Definition 7.18
we get that E1∧E2
ǫ
→ E′′1∧E2. Notice now that (E
′′
1∧E2)θ = E
′
1∧E2θ, and since E
′
1∧E2θ has an
SLD-refutation of length n using σ, we get by the induction hypothesis that (E′′1 ∧ E2) has an
SLD-refutation using δ, where for some substitution γ it holds that δγ ⊇ θσ, and dom(δγ−θσ)
is a set of template variables that are introduced during this SLD-refutation. Then, E1 ∧ E2
has an SLD-refutation using substitution δ which satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
F Proof of Lemma 7.35
Lemma 7.35 Let P be a program and G =← A be a goal such that [[A]]s(⊥IP) = 1 for all
Herbrand states s. Then, there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {G} with computed answer
equal to the identity substitution.
Proof. We establish a stronger statement which has the statement of the lemma as a special
case. Let us call a substitution θ closed if every expression in range(θ) is closed. We demon-
strate that for every closed basic substitution θ, if [[Aθ]]s(⊥IP) = 1 for all Herbrand states s,
then there exists an SLD-refutation for P ∪ {Aθ} with computed answer equal to the identity
substitution. The statement of the lemma is then a direct consequence for θ = ǫ.
We start by noting that A is always of the form (A0 A1 · · ·An), n ≥ 0 (if n = 0 then A0 is
of type o). We perform induction on the type ρ1 → · · · ρn → o of A0.
Outer Induction Basis: The outer induction basis is for n = 0, ie., for type(A0) = o, and in
order to establish it we need to perform an inner structural induction on A0.
Inner Induction Basis: For the inner induction basis we need to examine the cases where A0 is
0, 1, (E1 ≈ E2) and Q, where type(Q) = o. The first case is not applicable since [[0θ]]s(⊥IP) = 0.
The second case is immediate. We examine the latter two cases:
Case 1: A0 = (E1 ≈ E2). Since for all s it holds that [[(E1 ≈ E2)θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1, we get that
for all s, [[E1θ]]s(⊥IP) = [[E2θ]]s(⊥IP). By the fact that ⊥IP is a Herbrand interpretation, we
conclude that E1θ and E2θ must be identical expressions of type ι, and therefore they are
unifiable using the identity substitution.
Case 2: A0 = Q, with type(Q) = o. If θ(Q) = 0 then it can not be the case that [[A0]]s(⊥IP) = 1,
and therefore this case is not applicable. If θ(Q) = 1, the result is trivial. If on the other hand
Q 6∈ dom(θ), then this case is not applicable since it is not possible to have [[A0θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1,
for all s (eg. choose s such that s(Q) = 0).
Inner Induction Step: We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: A0 = (∃QE). We can assume without loss of generality that Q 6∈ dom(θ). Since
for all s it holds that [[(∃QE)θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1, it follows that [[Eθ]]s[b/Q](⊥IP) = 1 for some
b ∈ FUP(type(Q)). Let θ
′ = {Q/B} where B is a closed basic expression such that [[B]](⊥IP) = b
(the existence of such an expression B is ensured by Lemma 7.6). Then it is easy to see that
[[Eθθ′]]s(⊥IP) = 1 for all states s. By the induction hypothesis there exists an SLD-refutation
for P ∪ {Eθθ′} using some substitution σ and with computed answer equal to the identity
substitution. Using Lemma 7.27, it follows that there exists an SLD-refutation of P ∪ {Eθ}
using substitution δ where for some substitution γ it holds that δγ ⊇ {Q/B}σ; moreover,
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dom(δγ − {Q/B}σ) is a set of template variables that are introduced during the refutation of
P∪ {Eθ}. Since the restriction of σ to the free variables of Eθθ′ is the identity substitution, it
follows that the restriction of δ to the free variables of Eθ will either be empty or it will only
contain the binding Q/B. We conclude that there exists a refutation of P ∪ {(∃QE)θ} using
substitution ǫδ = δ. The computed answer is the identity substitution since Q is not a free
variable of (∃QE)θ.
Case 2: A0 = (E1 ∧ E2). By assumption, [[(E1 ∧ E2)θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1, for all s. Then, it holds
[[E1θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1 and [[E2θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1. By the induction hypothesis there exist SLD-refutations
for P∪{← E1θ} and P∪{← E2θ} with computed answers equal to the identity substitution. Let
θ1 and θ2 be the compositions of the substitutions used for the refutations of P∪{← E1θ} and
P∪{← E2θ} respectively. Now, since the computed answer of the refutation for P∪{E1θ} is the
identity, this implies that the free variables of E2θ that also appear free in E1θ do not belong to
dom(θ1). Moreover, the rest of the free variables of E2θ do not belong to dom(θ1), because the
variables of θ1 have been obtained by using resolution steps that only involve “fresh” variables.
In conclusion, the restriction of θ1 to the free variables of (E1∧E2)θ is the identity substitution
(and similarly for θ2). These observations imply that E2θθ1 = E2θ. But then, we can construct
a refutation for P ∪ {← (E1θ ∧ E2θ)} by first deriving ✷ from E1θ and then deriving ✷ from
E2θθ1 = E2θ. The substitution used for the refutation of P ∪ {← (E1 ∧ E2)θ} is θ1θ2 and the
computed answer is equal to the restriction of θ1θ2 to the free variables of (E1 ∧ E2)θ, which
gives the identity substitution.
Case 3: A0 = (E1 ∨ E2). By assumption, [[(E1 ∨ E2)θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1, for all s. Then, it either
holds that [[E1θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1 or [[E2θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1. Without loss of generality, assume that
[[E1θ]]s(⊥IP) = 1. By the induction hypothesis there exists an SLD-refutation for P∪{← E1θ}
with computed answer equal to the identity substitution. But then P∪{← (E1θ∨E2θ)} has an
SLD-refutation whose first step leads to ← (E1θ) using ǫ and then proceeds according to the
SLD-refutation of ← (E1θ). The computed answer of this refutation is obviously the identity
substitution.
Outer Induction Step: Assume the lemma holds when A0 has type ρ1 → · · · ρn−1 → o, n ≥ 1.
We establish the lemma for the case where A0 has type π = ρ1 → · · · ρn → o. We distinguish
the following cases:
Case 1: A0 = p (ie., A = pA1 · · ·An). This case is not applicable since ⊥IP(p) =⊥π and
therefore [[A]]s(⊥IP) = 0, for all s.
Case 2: A0 = Q (ie., A = QA1 · · ·An). If Q 6∈ dom(θ) then this case is not applica-
ble since it is not possible to have [[A]]s(⊥IP) = 1, for all s (eg. take s(Q) =⊥π). If on
the other hand Q ∈ dom(θ), then θ(Q) is a basic expression of type π, ie., it is a non-
empty finite union of lambda abstractions. We demonstrate the case where θ(Q) is a single
lambda abstraction; the more general case is similar and omitted. Assume therefore that
θ(Q) = λV.E. Then, since [[(λV.E) (A1θ) · · · (Anθ)]]s(⊥IP) = 1, by Lemma 7.14 we get that
[[(E{V/A1θ}) (A2θ) · · · (Anθ)]]s(⊥IP) = 1. By assumption, θ is a closed substitution and there-
fore the only free variable that appears in E is V. Therefore, [[((E{V/A1})A2 · · ·An)θ]]s(⊥IP) =
1. By the outer induction hypothesis we get that P ∪ {← ((E{V/A1})A2 · · ·An)θ} has an
SLD-refutation using substitution δ, with computed answer equal to the identity substitu-
tion. By the definition of SLD-resolution we get that P ∪ {← (λV.E) (A1θ) · · · (Anθ))} has an
SLD-refutation using the substitution ǫδ = δ; the computed answer of this refutation is the
restriction of δ to the free variables of ((λV.E)A1 · · ·An)θ which (by our previous discussion)
gives the identity substitution.
Case 3: A0 = λV.E (ie., A = (λV.E)A1 · · ·An. We can assume without loss of general-
ity that V 6∈ dom(θ) ∪ FV (range(θ)). Then, since [[(λV.Eθ) (A1θ) · · · (Anθ)]]s(⊥IP) = 1, by
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Lemma 7.14 we get that [[(Eθ{V/A1θ}) (A2θ) · · · (Anθ)]]s(⊥IP) = 1. By the outer induction
hypothesis P ∪ {← (Eθ{V/A1θ}) (A2θ) · · · (Anθ)} has an SLD-refutation using substitution δ,
with computed answer equal to the identity substitution. By the definition of SLD-resolution
we get that P ∪ {← ((λV.Eθ) (A1θ) · · · (Anθ))} has an SLD-refutation using the substitution
ǫδ = δ; the computed answer of this refutation is the restriction of δ to the free variables of
((λV.E)A1 · · ·An)θ which (by our previous discussion) gives the identity substitution.
Case 4: A0 = (E
′
∨
π E
′′) (ie., A = (E′
∨
π E
′′)A1 · · ·An), where π 6= o. The proof for this case
follows easily using the outer induction hypothesis.
Case 5: A0 = (E
′
∧
π E
′′) (ie., A = (E′
∧
π E
′′)A1 · · ·An), where π 6= o. The proof for this case
follows easily using the outer induction hypothesis.
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